Symmetric link key management for secure neighbor discovery in a decentralized wireless sensor network by Chew, Kelvin T.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2017-09
Symmetric link key management for secure
neighbor discovery in a decentralized wireless
sensor network
Chew, Kelvin T.
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56114
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.














Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
SYMMETRIC LINK KEY MANAGEMENT FOR SECURE 
NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY IN A DECENTRALIZED 








Thesis Advisor:  Preetha Thulasiraman 
Second Reader: Murali Tummala 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB  
No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank) 
2. REPORT DATE  
September 2017 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
SYMMETRIC LINK KEY MANAGEMENT FOR SECURE NEIGHBOR 
DISCOVERY IN A DECENTRALIZED WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
W7B46 
6. AUTHOR(S) Kelvin T. Chew 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 




9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
Marine Corps Systems Command and Naval Research Program 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
Wireless sensor networks provide a low-signature communications system that can be used for a wide 
variety of military applications. These networks are vulnerable to intrusion, however, and must balance 
security with performance and longevity. The neighbor discovery process is vital for nodes to maintain 
network connectivity but introduces security vulnerabilities; therefore, a lightweight security protocol is 
necessary to prevent unauthorized nodes from accessing network data and resources. In this thesis, we 
focus on the management of encryption keys in a resource-limited, peer-to-peer, decentralized network. 
Existing protocols for securing the neighbor discovery process use public key encryption, which is too 
computationally expensive for low-powered, resource-constrained IEEE 802.15.4-enabled devices. We 
therefore develop a key management scheme that modifies the Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) and 
Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) protocol and implements the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm 
for symmetric key management. We simulate our scheme in MATLAB to demonstrate its effectiveness in 





14. SUBJECT TERMS  
wireless sensor network, 6LOWPAN, key management, neighbor discovery, symmetric 
cryptography, identity-based cryptography, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, cyber 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
103 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii




Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
 
SYMMETRIC LINK KEY MANAGEMENT FOR SECURE NEIGHBOR 
DISCOVERY IN A DECENTRALIZED WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK 
 
 
Kelvin T. Chew 
Captain, United States Marine Corps 
B.S., Virginia Tech, 2006 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 





















R. Clark Robertson, Ph.D. 
Chair, Department of Electrical Engineering 
 iv




Wireless sensor networks provide a low-signature communications system that 
can be used for a wide variety of military applications. These networks are vulnerable to 
intrusion, however, and must balance security with performance and longevity. The 
neighbor discovery process is vital for nodes to maintain network connectivity but 
introduces security vulnerabilities; therefore, a lightweight security protocol is necessary 
to prevent unauthorized nodes from accessing network data and resources. In this thesis, 
we focus on the management of encryption keys in a resource-limited, peer-to-peer, 
decentralized network. Existing protocols for securing the neighbor discovery process use 
public key encryption, which is too computationally expensive for low-powered, 
resource-constrained IEEE 802.15.4-enabled devices. We therefore develop a key 
management scheme that modifies the Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) and Secure 
Neighbor Discovery (SEND) protocol and implements the Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
algorithm for symmetric key management. We simulate our scheme in MATLAB to 
demonstrate its effectiveness in securing the neighbor discovery protocol while providing 
energy efficiency, key security, and error resistance. 
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As a worldwide expeditionary force in the 21st century, the United States Marine 
Corps (USMC) has prioritized the protection of command and control (C2) systems and 
information networks [1]. These vital assets enable a commander to obtain and process 
information to make timely and informed decisions on the battlefield [1]. As our 
adversaries expand their network capabilities, the Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF) must adapt to a highly “contested-network environment” to exploit its 
advantages while denying the enemy those same advantages [1]. The key objectives are 
to reduce friendly electromagnetic signatures and harden our networks against 
degradation or compromise [1]. Ultimately, the MAGTF must leverage existing 
communications assets to minimize signature and defend networks while providing 
adequate C2 capability [1]. 
One such low-signature system in the USMC arsenal is the Tactical Remote 
Sensor System (TRSS), which is detailed in [2]. The TRSS supports the MAGTF by 
providing a continuous surveillance system that monitors activity in a chosen area [2]. 
Remote sensor operations are an economical and low-risk approach to expand the 
commander’s ability to collect information by providing general surveillance, early 
warning, and target acquisition [2]. Furthermore, this system can be integrated into the 
MAGTF network infrastructure for real-time, remote monitoring of the battle space [2]. 
When used properly, the TRSS is very difficult to detect due to its small electromagnetic 
footprint and built-in electronic countermeasures [2]. 
The potential for military applications of wireless sensor networking vastly 
expands beyond surveillance and targeting. Sensor network applications also include 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive detection, ranging, imaging, 
and acoustic tracking [3]. As a force protection measure, personnel can also wear sensor 
devices that track vital biometrics and unit locations [3]. Sensor network operations 
clearly contribute to the USMC’s priority of developing low-signature systems, as 
outlined in [1]. 
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A. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are comprised of specialized sensors and 
actuators and linked together via a wireless communications infrastructure [4]. Wireless 
sensor networks can either monitor physical or environmental conditions by passing data 
from a remote sensor to a central location or control remote systems by passing 
commands from a central location to a remote actuator [4]. The applications for sensor 
networks, which are the focus of this thesis, are broadly divided into two categories: 
remote monitoring and mobile object location tracking [4]. Remote monitoring 
applications periodically measure environmental conditions, while tracking applications 
generally provide real-time data updates of the target being tracked [4]. 
These networks consist of multiple nodes wirelessly linked together and designed 
for a specific function [4]. Sensor nodes, or end nodes, sense and collect data at the 
remote location [4]. Meanwhile, router nodes relay data within the network, and sink 
nodes, or base stations (BS), act as a gateway to exchange data with external networks 
[4]. These nodes tend to be small, low-power devices with low data rates and short 
transmission ranges [4]. They are battery-powered and communicate with each other via 
a radio transceiver [4].  
Although WSN support many useful applications at a relatively low cost, their 
implementation introduces several unique challenges. First, the low power capacity of 
each node places a high premium on the energy efficiency of the hardware, data 
processing methods, routing algorithms, and security protocols [4]. Second, the limited 
computational capability of the nodes prevents the use of complex, highly iterative 
processes [4]. Finally, the wireless nature of WSN presents the problem of security where 
we must protect the network and its data from passive and active attacks or intrusions [4]. 
B. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK STANDARDS 
The unique operational constraints of these WSN devices prompted the Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) to develop the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. 
This standard provided wireless connectivity among these devices with a scalable data 
rate depending on the application [5]. With the advent of Internet Protocol version 6 
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(IPv6), the IPv6 over Low-power Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoWPAN) protocol 
was developed to allow IPv6 data to transit IEEE 802.15.4 networks. 
1. IEEE 802.15.4 
In 2003, the IEEE developed the IEEE 802.15.4 standard for very low-cost, 
lower-power communications over low-rate personal area networks (LR-WPAN) [5]. The 
objectives of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard were to develop a simple and flexible protocol 
that simplified network installation, reduced cost, and provided efficient and reliable data 
transfer [5]. Since WPAN transmit information over short distances, the standard requires 
minimal infrastructure and can accommodate the small, lower-power devices often used 
in WSN applications [5]. 
This standard provides for basic security services to include data confidentiality, 
data authenticity, and replay protection [5]. IEEE 802.15.4 designates Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES)-128 as the block cipher, using 128-bit symmetric keys for 
encryption [5]. The cryptographic security mechanism uses either a group key that is 
shared among a group of devices or a link key which is shared only between two devices 
[5]. When applied in accordance with federal information processing standards in [6] and 
[7], AES-128 fulfills the Department of Defense (DOD) requirements for computer 
security. 
2. IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks 
 IPv6 was developed in the late 1990s to address the unforeseen shortfalls of IP 
version 4 (IPv4). IPv6 expanded the IP address size from 32 bits to 128 bits, simplified 
the header format, and improved the encoding of extensions and options to support data 
authentication, integrity, and confidentiality [8]; however, the limitations of IEEE 
802.15.4 required the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to develop IPv6 over Low-
power WPAN (6LoWPAN) to enable the transmission of IPv6 packets over IEEE 
802.15.4 enabled devices [9]. The 6LoWPAN protocol specifically provides for packet 
fragmentation and header compression necessary to make IPv6 practical on IEEE 
802.15.4 networks [9]. 
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Packet fragmentation is necessary due to the significant disparity between the 
standard IPv6 and IEEE 802.15.4 packet size. The maximum transmission unit (MTU) 
for IPv6 packets is 1280 octets, while the MTU for IEEE 802.15.4 packets is 127 octets 
[9]. When factoring in a maximum frame overhead of 25 octets and security overhead of 
21 octets, the IEEE 802.15.4 only has 81 octets of practical payload capacity [9]; 
therefore, the 6LoWPAN protocol defines an adaptation layer that performs packet 
fragmentation and reassembly at the data link layer to allow transmission of larger IPv6 
packets within the MTU constraints of IEEE 802.15.4 [9]. The 6LoWPAN adaption layer 
is shown alongside the standard IP stack in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  IP and 6LoWPAN Protocol Stacks in TCP/IP Model. Source: [10]. 
In addition to fragmentation, the 6LoWPAN protocol must perform header 
compression to account for the larger IPv6 header. Since the IPv6 header is 40 octets 
long, a normal IEEE 802.15.4 packet with a payload capacity of 81 octets only has 41 
octets remaining for application data [9]; therefore, header compression is necessary to 
reduce the overhead and maximize useful capacity. In the 6LoWPAN protocol, the 
header can potentially be compressed from 40 octets down to two octets by compressing 
common header values inherent to 6LoWPAN networks or by inferring values from other 
sources within the packet [9]. 
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C. RESEARCH MOTIVATIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
As recently as July 2017, the USMC published updated policy [11] mandating the 
use of public key infrastructure (PKI) on all Marine Corps systems and devices accessing 
Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN) resources. Encryption is a vital technique in 
providing confidentiality and authentication for transmitted data [12]. Consequently, PKI 
is an essential component of public key cryptography (PKC) that provides authentication 
for public keys used in the network [13]. By directing the use of PKI across all network 
systems, the USMC has taken an important step in hardening the defenses of its most 
widely used network. 
Although the MCEN is a garrison network infrastructure, it is even more 
important that we extend these defensive measures into a tactical network environment in 
the spirit of USMC priorities discussed in [1]. The USMC’s aging TRSS relies primarily 
on stealth and tamper alarms for physical security, but it does not possess any security 
measures, such as encryption, to protect its radio frequency (RF) data transmissions [2]. 
This security gap leaves the TRSS vulnerable to malicious systems acting as legitimate 
nodes and infiltrating the network’s data and resources; therefore, we must leverage the 
IEEE 802.15.4 and 6LoWPAN protocols to provide the USMC with a wireless sensor 
system that provides the same sensing and tracking capability while ensuring continuous 
security of its network.  
The objective of this research is to develop a key management system to provide 
secure neighbor discovery in a decentralized, resource-limited, peer-to-peer wireless 
sensor network. We focus on end-device communication in a decentralized network 
without distributed routers to perform higher level functions. First, we study the most 
efficient encryption and key generation methods available such that the energy 
constraints of a WSN are considered. Second, we aim to minimize secret key exposure, 
which impacts the security of the network, specifically if a node and its stored keys are 
compromised. Finally, we design a scheme that does not require a central hub for key 
management but instead is performed solely by the end nodes. 
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D. THESIS CONTRIBUTIONS 
To achieve these objectives, we develop a symmetric link key management 
scheme that implements the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm to decrease 
computational overhead while protecting the network against secret key exposure. 
The contributions of this thesis are: 
 Development of a symmetric link key management scheme for WSNs that 
generates and maintains link keys without a centralized node. 
 Simulation of the key management scheme to validate its effectiveness in 
finding one-hop neighbors and generating and maintaining link keys while 
staying within the operating constraints. 
 Measurement of the performance of the key management scheme for 
message efficiency, key distribution, energy consumption, and error 
resistance. 
In our review of prior literature, we found no other research that uses the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange algorithm to generate and distribute symmetric keys for securing 
the neighbor discovery process in decentralized wireless sensor networks. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is organized into five chapters. In Chapter II, we 
discuss relevant background information and previous research on neighbor discovery 
security protocols. Our proposed scheme for symmetric key distribution for secure 
neighbor discovery is detailed in Chapter III. Next, our experimental design is described 
in Chapter IV, to include the simulation parameters, program structure, and performance 
metrics. In Chapter V, we present the simulation results and discuss the significant 
implications for each of the performance metrics. Finally, we draw conclusions and 
propose related topics for future work in Chapter VI. All of the MATLAB code used for 
our simulations is included in the Appendix. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
In this chapter, we discuss the background that frames our work in symmetric key 
management for secure neighbor discovery in decentralized WSN. We begin with an 
overview of the Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) and Secure Neighbor Discovery 
(SEND), which serve as the basis for our research. Then, we review existing research in 
key management for secure neighbor discovery. 
A. NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY PROTOCOL 
All WSN nodes perform neighbor discovery to find and track the active nodes 
within their transmission range and detect changes to node addresses. In 1998, the 
Network Working Group (NWG) developed the IPv6 NDP [14], which is the basis for 
our key management scheme. The NDP defines the supported link types, addressing 
methods, neighbor discovery message formats, and functions of the messages transmitted 
between neighbor nodes [14]. 
This protocol supports addressing for several types of links, but we focus on the 
multicast and point-to-point links. Since IPv6 does not support broadcast [8], a multicast 
link is used to support data transmission to all nodes within range [14]. By sending a 
message to an all-nodes multicast address, a node can effectively “broadcast” that 
message to all known and unknown nodes within transmission range. The point-to-point 
link connects exactly two nodes together and is serviced with a unicast message sent from 
one node directly to the link-local address of the other node [14]. 
The NDP defines five message formats to include the router solicitation, router 
advertisement, neighbor solicitation, neighbor advertisement, and redirect message 
formats [14]. Since we focus on one-hop, peer-to-peer communication without distributed 
routers, we concentrate only on the two neighbor message formats in this thesis. 
Neighbor solicitations are sent to request the link-layer address of the target node 
while providing the link-layer address of the sending node [14]. These messages are 
multicast when a node is discovering a new node’s address or resolving a known address 
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[14]. Otherwise, neighbor solicitations are unicast when a node is verifying the 
reachability of a known neighbor [14]. Neighbor advertisements are sent as unicast 
responses to acknowledge solicitations [14]. 
The nodes create and maintain associations with their one-hop neighbors via the 
neighbor discovery messages. When a node is first activated and subsequently at a pre-
defined frequency, it initiates the discovery process by sending out neighbor solicitations 
to all nodes within transmission range [14]. The solicitation message is sent to the all-
nodes multicast address and includes the sender’s own address [14]. When an in-range 
node receives the solicitation, it verifies the target multicast address from the message 
against its own address [14]. It then creates a neighbor cache entry for the sending node 
and responds with a unicast neighbor advertisement back to the sender’s address [14]. 
The sending node then receives the advertisement and updates its neighbor cache to 
complete the neighbor association [14]. Nodes may also send unicast neighbor 
solicitations to addresses of known neighbors to verify that they are still active and that 
the stored address is still correct [14]. 
B. SECURE NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY 
Although the NDP provides a simple but effective procedure for creating and 
maintaining neighbor associations in a WSN, the protocol must be secured to protect the 
network from attack or intrusion by malicious nodes. The original NDP specification [14] 
directed the use of IP Security (IPSec) to secure neighbor discovery messages [15]. The 
IPSec architecture provides robust security for host-to-host communications at the 
network layer; however, IPSec requires a large amount of resources, which makes it 
infeasible for use with WSN devices [16]. Additionally, IPSec experiences problems with 
bootstrapping in the NDP autoconfiguration process, so it is not suitable for use in 
neighbor discovery [15]. In 2005, the NWG developed the SEND protocol [15] to protect 
the NDP, especially over the wireless medium. 
1. Neighbor Discovery Message Options 
The SEND protocol protects the NDP by introducing a set of options appended to 
all neighbor discovery messages [15]. The new options are the Cryptographically 
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Generated Address (CGA) option, the Rivert-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Signature option, 
and the Timestamp and Nonce options [15]. 
The CGA option is used to authenticate the sender of the message. The option 
contains the sender’s public key and associated parameters that are used to generate the 
sender’s CGA using the Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) [15], [17]. The message is 
then accepted by the recipient only if the message source address matches the CGA [15]. 
The primary disadvantage of the algorithm for CGA generation is its computational cost 
[18]. The mechanics of the algorithm, especially at higher security-level values, can 
require numerous SHA-1 computations on a single packet to meet the hash specification 
[18]. These iterations increase the processing time and energy consumption for each 
neighbor discovery message sent and received. 
The RSA Signature option uses public key signatures to ensure message integrity 
and sender authentication [15]. Using the RSA algorithm and SHA-1 hash function, the 
sender computes its Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 digital signature 
with its private key over a number of message parameters and appends it to the end of the 
message [15]. The receiver verifies the sender’s digital signature, again using the RSA 
algorithm and SHA-1 hash function [15]. The message is accepted only if the calculated 
signature matches the received signature [15]. RSA is based on PKC; however, PKC is 
generally considered too computationally costly for low-power devices [13]. 
In addition, the use of RSA-based digital signatures also requires public key 
authentication. Public keys must be authenticated to ensure that the public key contained 
in the neighbor discovery message belongs to the sending node. Public-key infrastructure 
is the mechanism that authenticates public keys by associating each public key to its 
respective node via a public-key certificate [13]. These certificates are generated and 
issued by a Certificate Authority (CA) [13]. In a WSN, a router or sink node with higher 
processing and power capacity are required to perform the functions of the CA. Without 
these router or sink nodes, the use of certificates to authenticate public keys is not 
feasible in a decentralized WSN. 
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The Timestamp and Nonce options are used to protect against replay attacks [15]. 
More specifically, the Timestamp is an integer time value that ensures unsolicited 
advertisements have not been replayed [15]. The receiver accepts a message only if the 
Timestamp does not exceed a certain “delta” time from the current time [15]. Meanwhile, 
the Nonce is a random number selected by the sender that protects against replay of 
solicited advertisements [15]. The receiver accepts an advertisement only if the Nonce of 
the advertisement matches the Nonce of the corresponding solicitation [15]. 
2. Further Disadvantages of SEND 
The SEND protocol does not define a standard for message encryption and 
instead relies on IPSec as directed in NDP for message confidentiality. The resource cost 
associated with IPSec makes it impractical for use in our WSN devices. Consequently, all 
neighbor discovery messages are sent in the clear, allowing attackers to read node 
addresses, keys, and other vital data. Attackers can also interpolate packet traffic patterns 
and gain information about the network. 
A study measuring the energy consumption of symmetric and asymmetric 
cryptographic algorithms was performed in [19]. The comparison between the energy 
cost to perform the RSA digital signature algorithm and AES encryption and decryption 
on a single 127-byte packet is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Energy Consumption in Joules for RSA and AES. 
Adapted from [19] and [20]. 
Algorithm Key Setup Sign/Encrypt Verify/Decrypt Total Energy 
RSA-1024 270.13 mJ 546.5 mJ 15.97 mJ 832.6 mJ 
AES-ECB-128 7.87 μJ 205.74 μJ  316.23 μJ 529.8 μJ 
 
Comparing total energy requirements for AES and RSA, we estimate that two 
neighboring nodes can perform the AES encryption and decryption of over 1,500 packets 
for every one RSA digital signature that is signed and verified; therefore, symmetric key 
encryption offers a significant advantage in energy efficiency, which is crucial to the 
longevity of the decentralized WSN. 
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Given the above-mentioned disadvantages, the current SEND protocol is 
insufficient to address the security concerns of decentralized WSNs employing low-
power devices. 
C. APPROACHES TO KEY MANAGEMENT IN NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY 
Recent literature reveals several novel ideas for key management to support the 
security of neighbor discovery. These schemes predominantly apply only to centralized 
WSN that feature at least one higher function node to perform key management 
functions. In this section, we review some of these schemes from which we draw 
concepts to design our proposed scheme. 
1. Group Key Establishment for Secure Multicast Communication 
In [21], the authors devised a protocol for establishing group keys for multicast 
communications between an identified set of sensor nodes. First, an initiator node 
identifies a set of sensor nodes to create the multicast group [21]. The initiator then 
broadcasts a message along with its digital signature to initiate the group key 
establishment [21]. Next, each receiving node verifies the signature and computes a 
unique value using its private key with other parameters and returns the value to the 
initiator [21]. After receiving responses from all active nodes in the group, the initiator 
encodes all the unique values, generates a group key from the encoded values, and sends 
a multicast message with digital signature back to the group containing the encoded 
values and a hash of the group key [21]. Finally, each node computes the group key from 
the encoded values and verifies the key against the hash [21]. 
There are several issues that prevent the use of this scheme in a decentralized 
WSN. First, the scheme relies on public key encryption (PKE) and digital signature and, 
as discussed previously, the required computation and processing are too costly for the 
low-power devices in the network. Second, group keys are generated from the inputs of a 
select group of nodes. The addition of even a single node to the group renders the key 
useless, requiring a new key to be generated. Finally, the scheme requires each node to 
have complete knowledge of the network topology to form its groups; therefore, this 
scheme likely would not be useful in neighbor discovery. 
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We favor the idea of generating keys without the use of a trusted key distribution 
center (KDC). Our scheme features a mechanism for direct key establishment between 
nodes while allowing for flexibility when nodes become active or inactive. Finally, keys 
should be locally computed by the nodes rather than transmitted. 
2. Network Admission Control Based on Symmetric Key Mechanisms 
A network admission control scheme for 6LoWPANs using symmetric key 
encryption was presented in [22]. The scheme emulates the secure neighbor discovery 
process by detecting nearby nodes and performing node authentication and authorization 
to join the network. In this scheme, each node is preloaded with a unique symmetric key 
shared with the border router [22]. When detected by the border router, the node performs 
a one-way challenge authentication with the router [22]. With their shared key, the node 
can decrypt the challenge message containing the secret global network key that is used 
for communication with other nodes in the network [22]. 
This scheme also poses issues with our decentralized network environment. In a 
decentralized WSN, there is no border router to perform key exchange. Also, we wish to 
avoid the transmission of keys even if they are encrypted. Most importantly, the use of 
one global network key for node-to-node communication creates a single point of failure 
where the entire network’s security can be compromised [13]. Nevertheless, this scheme 
presents the efficiency advantage of symmetric key cryptography and the idea of 
incorporating challenge authentication to neighbor discovery. 
3. Identity-Based Cryptography 
Identity-based cryptography (IBC) was introduced in [23] and allows for a node’s 
public key to be generated from a node identifier (ID) [13]. In this system, every node is 
preloaded with an ID and private key [13]. Communicating nodes exchange only their 
node IDs which are then used to locally generate the appropriate public keys for 
communication [13]. Identity-based cryptography eliminates the need for PKI since 
public keys are not transmitted and do not need to be authenticated [13]. 
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Once again, the central issue is that PKE is too costly to implement in a 
decentralized WSN when network longevity is a priority. Also, the alternative of 
preloading pairwise symmetric keys for every node pair is inefficient and difficult to 
manage [13]; however, the idea of linking node IDs to stored keys is a central component 
of our proposed key management scheme for neighbor discovery. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we provided an overview of the NDP and the security mechanisms 
implemented by SEND. We then argued against the adequacy of SEND by identifying 
key issues with its use in decentralized WSNs. A brief overview of related research in 
key management for secure neighbor discovery concludes the chapter. 
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III. SYMMETRIC KEY MANAGEMENT FOR 
NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY 
In this chapter, we discuss our proposed key management scheme for generating 
and distributing symmetric keys for secure neighbor discovery without a centralized 
KDC. Our scheme addresses the security and efficiency issues of SEND and the 
previously described work found in the literature. Our scheme uses the current NDP 
neighbor discovery messages while implementing symmetric key encryption for 
confidentiality and energy efficiency. Although we include the Timestamp and Nonce 
options from the SEND protocol, we replace the CGA option and RSA signature with a 
protocol for secret link key exchange to protect communications between any pair of 
nodes. As with identity-based cryptography, the scheme implements node IDs so that 
each node can associate a link key with the node with which it communicates. 
To minimize secret key exposure, each node generates and stores keys only for 
those nodes within its transmission range rather than preloading a pairwise key for every 
other node in the network. The scheme also implements a challenge authentication 
mechanism using a global network key before nodes perform the secret key exchange. 
The Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange algorithm is used for link key generation 
between nodes due to its relative security and efficiency. Consequently, keys are always 
locally generated by the nodes rather than wirelessly transmitted between nodes. 
A. DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY EXCHANGE ALGORITHM 
Generally, the DH key exchange algorithm allows two entities to generate a single 
shared secret over an insecure channel without transmitting any secrets [24], [25]. The 
security of this algorithm relies on the discrete logarithmic problem [24], which is the 
difficulty of solving for x, given y, g, and p, where 
 	 	 . (1) 
The network first establishes two required system parameters, the prime modulus 
p and the generator g. These very large prime numbers are publicly known and used by 
all network nodes [24]. When two nodes A and B wish to establish a link, they each 
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choose a random secret number  and , respectively [24]. Then, node A computes the 
public value 
 	 	 , (2) 
while node B computes the public value 
 	 	 . (3) 
Next, nodes A and B exchange  and  over the channel and use those values to 
compute the key values  and , where 
 	 	  (4) 
and 
 	 	 . (5) 
By substituting  and  in  and , respectively, and using the properties of 
modular exponentiation [25], we find 
 	 	 	 	 	 	  (6) 
and 
 	 	 	 	 	 	 . (7) 
Finally, applying the product rule for exponents [25], we conclude the shared key 
 . (8) 
Therefore, nodes A and B have computed a shared secret key K without 
transmitting any secret values. Even if an attacker were to intercept any of the transmitted 
values, the discrete logarithmic problem prevents it from computing the shared key 
without the secret values  and  [24]. 
B. SYMMETRIC KEY MANAGEMENT USING DIFFIE-HELLMAN 
As with the NDP, neighbor associations are established and maintained via the 
neighbor discovery messages; however, with our scheme, these messages are modified to 
ensure integrity and encrypted to maintain confidentiality. The use of a secret network 
group key and node IDs provides authentication, while the DH key exchange protocol 
offers flexible and independent link key management without excessive overheard. Prior 
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to deployment, all nodes are preloaded with the network group key and the node IDs for 
all nodes in the network.  
1. Neighbor Discovery Message Processing 
Our scheme modifies the structure of the NDP neighbor solicitation and 
advertisement messages detailed in [14] to take advantage of identity-based 
cryptography. The neighbor discovery message follows the Internet Control Message 
Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) [15], so it includes an IPv6 header, an ICMPv6 header, the 
message-specific data, and an options field; however, our scheme simplifies the packet by 
replacing the CGA option and RSA signature with a node ID. This message format is 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Neighbor Discovery Message Format 
Our scheme authenticates a node as a genuine network node when it uses a 
legitimate node ID and possesses a valid network group key to decrypt messages. All 
neighbor discovery messages are first processed for authentication when received by a 
node. After reading the header data per the network routing protocol, the receiving node 
first checks the node ID for a match in its memory cache. If there is no match, then the 
sending node is not authenticated, and the message is discarded. When there is a match, 
the receiving node checks for a link key corresponding to the node ID. If a link key exists 
between the nodes, then that key is used with AES-128 to decrypt the message data, 
digest of the node ID and Nonce, and Timestamp. Otherwise, the receiving node defaults 
to decrypting the encrypted data with the network group key. 
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After decryption, the receiving node checks for message integrity. First, the node 
uses the Message Digest 5 (MD5) hash function to compute the hash of the node ID and 
Nonce and checks the hash against the decrypted digest. Next, it reads the Timestamp and 
checks whether the elapsed time between the Timestamp and the current time is within a 
“delta” value that is established by the network administrator. If the message fails either 
of these checks, then the receiving node discards the message. When the receiving node 
has successfully authenticated the message and ensured its integrity, the node reads the 
message data to determine the type of message received. 
2. Neighbor Discovery Message Exchange 
Our scheme uses the neighbor solicitation and advertisement messages from the 
NDP but also adds a key request and key exchange message to perform the DH key 
exchange. Neighbor solicitation messages are addressed as either multicast messages to 
all network nodes or unicast messages to known nodes. Neighbor advertisement and key 
exchange messages are always unicast responses to solicitation messages. 
a. Multicast Neighbor Solicitation 
Each node periodically sends a neighbor solicitation to a multicast address that 
includes all nodes within the network’s address range. The purpose of the multicast 
solicitation message is to find unknown neighbors within transmission range and initiate 
key exchange to create neighbor links. The message sequence for multicast neighbor 
solicitation between node A and an unknown neighbor B is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  Multicast Neighbor Solicitation to Unknown Neighbor 
The multicast neighbor solicitation process begins when node A sends a multicast 
solicitation to node B, which is always encrypted with the network group key. Node B 
processes the node ID, discovers it does not have a link key with node A, and decrypts 
the message with the group key. To establish a link, node B then sends a key request 
message to node A to initiate the DH key exchange protocol. Upon receipt of the key 
request, node A calculates  and sends it to node B in a key exchange message, while 
node B calculates  and sends it to node A. Nodes A and B then use the received values 
of  to compute the shared key  and write into memory the key associated with the 
other’s node ID. To complete the link process, node A sends a new unicast neighbor 
solicitation message to node B encrypted with the newly generated link key. Node B 
processes the node ID, decrypts the message with the link key, and validates the 
solicitation message. After verifying node A’s key in its memory cache, node B responds 
with a neighbor advertisement message. Finally, Node A processes the advertisement and 
verifies node B’s key in memory. 
Since the multicast address includes all network nodes, known neighbors of the 
sending node also receive the multicast neighbor solicitation messages. The message 
sequence for known neighbors A and B is shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  Multicast Neighbor Solicitation to Known Neighbor 
Since nodes A and B are known to each other, a pairwise key for this link exists in 
their respective memory caches. In this case, node A sends the multicast solicitation 
message, encrypted with the network group key, to node B, a known neighbor. When 
node B processes the message and identifies node A’s ID, it uses their link key to decrypt 
the message. The decryption will obviously fail, and node B discards the message. 
Generally, known neighbors always discard multicast neighbor solicitation messages 
received from each other once the link has been established. 
b. Unicast Neighbor Solicitation 
Once two nodes have established a link, they rely on periodic unicast neighbor 
solicitation messages to maintain the link. A unicast neighbor solicitation message can 
only be sent to known neighbors with known node addresses. The message sequence for 
unicast neighbor solicitation between known neighbors A and B is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  Unicast Neighbor Solicitation to Known Neighbor 
Here, node A sends node B a neighbor solicitation message encrypted with their 
link key. Node B decrypts the message with the same link key, determines that it is a 
solicitation, and verifies the memory cache entry for node A. Node B then responds with 
a unicast neighbor advertisement to node A encrypted with the link key. Finally, node A 
 21
processes the message and verifies its memory cache entry for node B. This completes 
the unicast neighbor solicitation process. 
3. Key Expiration 
To protect against secret key exposure, our key management scheme also 
implements a mechanism that deletes link keys between inactive nodes. This prevents 
attackers from compromising an inactive node, stealing stored keys, and masquerading as 
that node in the network. When a node becomes inactive, either by going to sleep or 
running out of battery power, it stops sending neighbor solicitation messages and 
responding to its neighbors’ solicitations; therefore, its link keys are no longer necessary 
to maintain the network’s neighbor links. 
Each node maintains an individual counter associated with every node ID. This 
counter tracks a node’s active neighbors, and it is initialized to zero to represent an 
inactive node. When node A receives a neighbor advertisement from node B, as depicted 
in Figure 5, node A sets the counter for node B to a maximum countdown value (e.g., 3). 
If node A does not receive an advertisement from node B, then it decrements the counter. 
When a counter reaches zero (e.g., after three failed neighbor solicitation messages), the 
key attached to the corresponding node ID is deleted from memory. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we described our symmetric key management scheme for secure 
neighbor discovery. We then explained the mechanics of the DH key exchange algorithm 
and its application to our scheme. Finally, we discussed our modifications to the NDP 
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The simulations for our key management scheme are designed and implemented 
in MATLAB. The program simulates message transmission and processing, the MD5 
hash function, AES-128 encryption and decryption, and the DH key exchange protocol. 
The simulation is divided into three components: network initialization and node 
deployment, neighbor discovery and key exchange, and measurement of performance 
metrics. In our simulations, we measure message efficiency, key distribution, power 
consumption, and error resistance. 
A. NETWORK INITIALIZATION AND NODE DEPLOYMENT 
In the first stage of the simulation, we initialize the network and node 
characteristics given user-input parameters and deploy a random distribution of nodes 
across the network field. 
1. Network Parameters 
The simulation receives inputs for several key parameters to provide 
comprehensive testing of the scheme for a variety of network structures and node 
characteristics. Users can customize the network field size, total number of nodes, 
maximum node transmission range, simulation runtime, and network data rate. 
2. Node Tracking 
The simulation uses a structure array N to track information about the network 
nodes and provide a representation of each node’s memory cache. The N array is 
constantly updated as nodes perform neighbor discovery and key exchange. An example 
snapshot of the first ten of 100 node entries in N after 24 hours of simulated runtime is 




Table 2.   10-Node Snapshot of Node Tracking Structure Array N 
Node State x y nodeID idStorage keyStorage Counter 
Power 
(mWh) 
1 1 30 50 ‘f0d33b4c… 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 8.7778 
2 1 30 70 ‘e1baf3b2… 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 7.6980 
3 1 5 84 ‘a75d623… 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 5.7713 
4 1 91 4 ‘0834f12e… 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 3.2976 
5 1 90 12 ‘701b182… 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 4.6721 
6 1 8 77 ‘9b2b8db… 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 6.3218 
7 1 18 42 ‘7e6201d4… 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 6.8511 
8 1 97 28 ‘c02df246… 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 5.7589 
9 1 20 33 ‘84e22dcf… 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 6.3041 
10 1 44 9 ‘911465d… 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 1 100 cell 4.3846 
 
The first five columns of N track each node’s active or inactive status, coordinate 
location, and node ID. The idStorage, keyStorage, and counter cell arrays represent each 
node’s memory cache, which is vital for key management. These cell arrays store node 
IDs, link keys, and expiration counters for all other nodes in the network. Finally, the 
power value represents the cumulative power in milliwatt-hours consumed by the node at 
that given time. 
3. Node Power Consumption 
The simulation uses defined power consumption rates for all simulated node 
functions. When measuring network energy consumption, we account for the node power 
consumption due to message transmission and processing, AES-128 encryption, DH key 
exchange, and the MD5 hash function. 
Nodes transmit, receive, and process neighbor discovery messages in the neighbor 
discovery and key management processes. When a node initiates a neighbor solicitation, 
it consumes power when transmitting the solicitation message, while the receiving node 
consumes power receiving and processing the message. The power consumption values 
for the functions related to messaging are shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3.   Node Power Consumption in Milliwatt-Hours for 127-Byte Message 
Functions. Adapted from [26] and [27]. 
Function Power Consumption 
Transmit 8.00 10  mWh 
Receive 5.87 10  mWh 
Process 9.33 10  mWh 
 
Nodes also consume power when performing AES-128 encryption and decryption 
on the neighbor discovery messages. When a node sends a message, it must perform AES 
key setup and encryption, while the receiving node must perform its own key setup and 
decryption. The power consumption values for the AES-128 functions on 127-byte 
neighbor discovery messages are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4.   Node Power Consumption in Milliwatt-Hours for AES-128 Functions 
on 127-Byte Messages. Adapted from [19] and [26]. 
Function Power Consumption 
Key Setup 2.18 10  mWh 
Encryption 1.09 10  mWh 
Decryption 2.47 10  mWh 
 
In the DH key exchange protocol, nodes consume power both in the exchange of 
S values and in the computation of the key K. The authors in [19] measured the energy 
consumption for the DH key exchange algorithm that produces a 1,024-bit key. The 
resultant conversion to power consumption per node is shown in Table 5. 
Table 5.   Node Power Consumption in Milliwatt-Hours for 1024-bit DH Key 
Exchange Algorithm. Adapted from [19]. 
Function Key Generation Key Exchange 
DH-1024 0.125 mWh 0.146 mWh 
 
The MD5 hash function is also performed with every message transmission. A 
transmitting node uses the MD5 function to generate a digest of the node ID and Nonce, 
while the receiving node uses the MD5 function to compute a hash of the received node 
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ID and Nonce to check against the digest. In [19], the authors measured the energy 
consumption of the MD5 algorithm to be 0.59 μJ/B. Since the function processes eight 
total bytes of data from the node ID and Nonce, the converted power consumption for 
MD5 is 1.312 10  mWh. 
B. NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY AND KEY MANAGEMENT 
After the network is initialized, the main program of the simulation performs the 
neighbor discovery and key exchange protocols of our scheme. This program runs in 
looped one-minute iterations for a user-defined runTime. In each iteration, the program 
may perform any of the following tasks: a multicast solicitation, a unicast solicitation, 
deletion of expired keys, activation of inactive nodes, or measurement of performance 
metrics. 
1. Multicast and Unicast Solicitation 
The multicast function simulates the entire multicast solicitation message 
exchange. The multicast function first calculates the Euclidean distances between all 
nodes to determine the nodes that are in transmission range of each other. An encrypted 
neighbor solicitation message is then assembled using the neighborSolicit function and 
transmitted between all in-range neighbors. 
Next, the transmitter’s nodeID is separated from the message, and the function 
parses the receiver’s keyStorage cells for a key matching the nodeID. If there is a match, 
then that link key is used to decrypt. Otherwise, the GroupKey is used to decrypt the 
message. The packetAuthenticate function separates the encrypted portion of the 
message, performs the decryption, validates the Nonce, Timestamp, and message data 
type, and returns a pass or fail. If the message fails the packetAuthenticate function, it is 
discarded by the receiver. Otherwise, the DHKey function is used to perform the DH key 
exchange between the receiver and transmitter. The resulting key output is then written 
into the receiver’s keyStorage cell in N and the node’s expiration counter is set to three, 
signifying an established link. 
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Finally, the neighborSolicit function sends an advertisement from the receiver 
back to the original transmitter. The packetAuthenticate function is used again to decrypt 
the packet with the new link key, and after successful authentication, the original 
transmitter’s keyStorage and counter cells in N are updated. 
The unicast function simulates the entire unicast message exchange and operates 
very similarly to the multicast function. The primary difference is in the method in which 
the program chooses nodes for message transmission. While the multicast function uses 
transmission range, the unicast function parses the keyStorage cells in N and transmits 
only to those node IDs that have non-zero attached key values. 
2. Key Expiration 
The decrementCounter function is used to decrement all expiration counters in the 
node array N every 20 minutes. After 60 minutes, or three consecutive failed unicast 
neighbor solicitations, the expireKey function is used to clear the key from the 
corresponding keyStorage cell in the node array N. 
3. Node Initiation and Activation 
When the network is initialized, the simulation only activates a portion of the 
nodes, leaving the remaining nodes in sleep mode. Random sets of nodes are then 
activated incrementally to demonstrate the scheme’s effectiveness for neighbor discovery 
and key exchange when new active nodes are introduced to the network. Activation is 
performed by simply toggling the active status of the selected nodes in N. 
4. AES-128 and MD5 Hash Function 
The aes set of functions [28] perform AES key setup, encryption, and decryption 
in MATLAB. Our simulation uses AES-128 Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB) for 
encryption and decryption of all transmitted messages. The DataHash function [29] 
performs the MD5 hash function and is used for generating the hash value of the node ID 
and Nonce in the neighbor discovery messages. This function can receive any type of 
input and produces a 128-bit hexadecimal string output. 
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C. MEASUREMENT OF PERFORMANCE METRICS 
The performance metrics of message efficiency, key distribution, power 
consumption, and error resistance are measured throughout the simulation by periodically 
reading values from N and the message counters, which are then compiled and plotted. 
1. Message Efficiency 
We define message efficiency as the ratio between the number of neighbor 
solicitation messages sent and the number of neighbor advertisements received by a node. 
Since there are two types of neighbor solicitation messages in our scheme, unicast and 
multicast, we measure the efficiency of each solicitation type. A message efficiency 
closer to one demonstrates that a node is more likely to receive an advertisement in 
response to a solicitation. An efficiency closer to zero suggests that a node is sending 
mostly wasted solicitations that are discarded by their recipients. The simulation 
computes and plots message efficiency every hour using values from the message 
counters unicastCount, multicastCount, and ackCount. 
2. Key Distribution 
Key distribution is the measure of the average number of keys stored per node. 
This metric is important since we aim to protect against secret key exposure by 
minimizing the number of keys stored in each node. Every minute, the simulation polls 
the node array N for the total number of active nodes and active keys to determine the 
average number of active keys stored per node. The simulation then plots the average key 
distribution as a function of time. 
3. Power Consumption 
Power consumption is the measure of the average node energy expended over 
time to perform the functions necessary for message transmission and processing, 
encryption, and DH key exchange. Using the power consumption rates discussed in the 
previous chapter, we update the power value in N after each function is executed in the 
simulation. We measure and compute the average power consumed per active node once 
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every iteration. The simulation then plots the average node power capacity remaining as a 
function of time. 
4. Error Resistance 
Our simulation includes a user-defined variable error that represents the overall 
error rate of the model. The error value ranges from zero to one and accounts for 
transmission errors (e.g., dropped packets from collisions, harsh operating environments, 
etc.), faulty encryption or decryption, or errors in processing. An error of zero represents 
an ideal network environment where all packets are received and processed correctly. 
According to [30], a packet loss rate of 2.5% is generally acceptable in an IEEE 802.15.4 
WSN. The simulation incorporates error in the packetAuthenticate function, forcing the 
receiving node to randomly discard a percentage of messages based on the error value. 
Error resistance is the ability of the key management scheme to withstand 
network errors and maintain neighbor links. Due to the key expiration mechanism, nodes 
delete keys after sending multiple unicast neighbor solicitation messages without a 
neighbor advertisement response. Since the error value affects the receipt of both 
neighbor solicitations and advertisements, nodes are more likely to erroneously delete 
keys for active links at higher levels of error; therefore, we can use the key distribution 
plots to evaluate error resistance based on sudden decreases in keys stored per node. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we described the three components of the simulation: the network 
initialization and node deployment phase, the main program that executes the neighbor 
discovery and key management scheme, and the measurement and computation of 
performance metrics. 
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V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A series of three simulations was conducted to perform network initialization and 
node deployment, demonstrate the development of neighbor associations with network 
growth, and measure the four identified performance metrics. In this chapter, we discuss 
our simulation results and their significance in improving secure neighbor discovery.  
A. NETWORK INITIALIZATION AND NODE DEPLOYMENT 
In our first simulation, we set the network size to a 100 100 m2 field and the 
simulation time to 24 hours. We used a network of 100 nodes, each with a transmission 
range of 30 meters and data rate of 250 kbps, which is the maximum data rate for IEEE 
802.15.4 [5]. Each node was equipped with a 9-volt battery that provided 4500 mWh of 
power capacity. All nodes were set to send multicast neighbor solicitation messages 
every 60 minutes and unicast solicitations every 20 minutes. Network nodes were then 
deployed in a random distribution within the defined network field, as shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.  Random Distribution of Nodes in 100 100 m2 Network Field 




















B. DEVELOPMENT OF NEIGHBOR ASSOCIATIONS 
Although the network was initialized to host 100 nodes, we activated only ten 
nodes to start, leaving the remaining 90 nodes in sleep mode. Every five hours, we 
conducted a node activation cycle where an additional 25 randomly selected nodes were 
activated. The simulation shows that our scheme successfully generated links for all 
newly discovered neighbors after each activation cycle. The development of the 
network’s neighbor associations is shown in Figures 7 through 10, where the lines 
represent pairwise keys shared between the connected nodes. This series of plots shows a 
significant improvement in the network infrastructure as new nodes are activated and 
links are created to improve routing efficiency and reliability. These links were generated 
without a centralized BS, which increases flexibility and decreases overall energy costs 
for messaging. 
 
Figure 7.  Neighbor Associations for 25 Active Nodes at Time = 6 Hours 





















Figure 8.  Neighbor Associations for 50 Active Nodes at Time = 12 Hours 
 
Figure 9.  Neighbor Associations for 75 Active Nodes at Time = 18 Hours 





















Figure 10.  Neighbor Associations for 100 Active Nodes at Time = 24 Hours 
C. MESSAGE EFFICIENCY 
Message efficiency was measured based on the number of multicast solicitations, 
unicast solicitations, and advertisements sent by all nodes in the 24-hour simulation 
period. The plot of cumulative message traffic is shown in Figure 11. From Figure 11, we 
find a strong correlation between the number of unicast solicitation messages and 
advertisements. This correlation suggests that the transmission of neighbor 
advertisements is more dependent on unicast solicitations than multicast solicitations. 
This correlation is even more clear in Figure 12, where we show the message efficiency 




Figure 11.  Cumulative Neighbor Discovery Message Traffic After 24 Hours 
 
Figure 12.  Multicast and Unicast Message Efficiency Over 24-Hour Simulation 















































From Figure 12, we see that multicast solicitations are only used to discover new 
neighbors and initiate key exchange at each node activation cycle. As expected from our 
scheme, nodes discard all multicast solicitations once their links have been established, 
resulting in the multicast efficiency of zero between node activation cycles. The message 
efficiency for unicast solicitations shows that our scheme is heavily reliant on unicast 
solicitations for maintaining neighbor links. As static networks become increasingly 
stable, we can substantially reduce the frequency of multicast messages to save node 
energy and increase network longevity. 
D. KEY DISTRIBUTION 
The key distribution of the network stayed very consistent throughout the 
simulation. On average for a 100 100 m2 network, each node only needed to store 
pairwise keys for about 20% of the active nodes in the network even after multiple node 
activation cycles. The average number of keys stored per node for each active network 
size is shown in Table 6. 
Table 6.   Average Number of Keys Stored Per Node Over 24-Hour Simulation 
Total Active Nodes Average Keys Per Node Key Percentage 
10 2 20.0% 
25 5.12 20.5% 
50 9.80 19.6% 
75 14.72 19.6% 
100 20.32 20.3% 
 
This key distribution is a marked improvement in efficiency over the SEND 
protocol, which uses PKE in its neighbor discovery messaging. In PKE, nodes store 
public keys for all other nodes in the network; however, due to the limited transmission 
range of the nodes, only a small percentage of those keys are useful. Since our scheme 
only generates keys between nodes in range of each other, we infer that only 20% of the 
network is ever in range of any given node; therefore, 80% of the public keys stored in 
each node go unused if the SEND protocol is used. 
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The active node count and average number of keys stored per node are also 
graphically depicted in Figure 13. The drop-off in average number of keys stored per 
node every five hours indicates the short time immediately following a node activation 
cycle when new keys had not yet been generated. 
 
Figure 13.  Average Number of Keys Stored per Node Over 24-Hour Simulation 
These results confirm that our scheme protects against the threat of secret key 
exposure by limiting the number of keys stored by an active node. If any single node was 
to be compromised, the resulting security breach would be contained to no more than 
20% of the network, regardless of the network size. Additionally, by reducing the number 
of keys stored in memory, we conserve the limited memory resources inherent to IEEE 
802.15.4 enabled devices. 
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E. POWER CONSUMPTION 
Our second set of simulations measured the average node power consumption for 
three network sizes of 25, 50, and 100 nodes. The simulation was run until all nodes had 
fully expended their battery power. Since all nodes were equipped with 9 V batteries, 
each node started with 4500 mWh of power capacity. The average power consumption 
per node for all three networks is depicted in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14.  Average Power Consumption for Networks of 25, 50, and 100 Nodes 
From Figure 14, we see that smaller network sizes have greater longevity since 
there are fewer neighbor associations to maintain. Generally, doubling the network size 
halves the node power consumption. The 100-node network required the most energy and 
lasted only about 15 days. Meanwhile, the 50-node network lasted about 33 days, and the 
25-node network lasted nearly 70 days.  
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According to [2], the individual sensors of the TRSS are expected to operate 
continuously for up to 30 days; therefore, the 50-node network can provide the same 30-
day period of operation with a much more robust and redundant coverage of one node 
every four meters. Also, as previously discussed, we can decrease power consumption by 
reducing the frequency of neighbor discovery messages, or we can simply reduce the 
number of active nodes in the network. In the case of the 50-node network, we can set 
half the network to sleep mode and double the network longevity while still maintaining 
effective coverage of one node every eight meters. 
F. ERROR RESISTANCE 
In our final set of simulations, we measured the effects of error on our scheme. 
We initialized a 100 100 m2 network of 50 nodes with a run time of 12 hours. We then 
performed the simulation for error values of 0, 0.05, 0.10, and 0.20 and evaluated the 
error resistance from the key distribution plots for each error value, which are shown in 
Figures 15 through 18. This series of plots shows a gradual degradation in the ability of 
the network to maintain neighbor associations as the error rate increased. 
 
Figure 15.  No Degradation of Key Distribution for Error = 0% 































Figure 16.  Minimal Degradation of Key Distribution for Error = 5% 
 
Figure 17.  Moderate Degradation of Key Distribution for Error = 10% 
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Figure 18.  Significant Degradation of Key Distribution for Error = 20% 
In the ideal case shown in Figure 15 where no messages were discarded due to 
error, no keys were erroneously deleted from the nodes. From Figure 16, at 5% error, 
which is twice the acceptable packet loss rate of 2.5%, the effects on key distribution 
were minimal. From Figures 17 and 18, we see that at higher error levels of 10% and 
20%, the network performance was significantly degraded as nodes lost many of their 
neighbor links. The simulation shows that our scheme is able to adequately maintain 
network links given a reasonable and expected level of packet loss inherent to wireless 
communications.  
We also note that at higher expected error levels, increasing the frequency of 
solicitation messages improves performance and prevents active keys from expiring. 
Conversely, at lower expected error levels, fewer solicitation messages can be sent while 
maintaining the same performance and improving network energy efficiency. 
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G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we reviewed the results of our simulations and provided analysis 
of our key performance metrics, to include message efficiency, key distribution, power 
consumption, and error resistance. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The use of WSN will only increase as the focus of our C2 infrastructure shifts 
toward a highly secure, low-signature solution that can provide commanders with 
accurate and timely information in the most austere operating environments. Current 
sensor systems do not provide adequate security against a growing network threat. Our 
research was motivated by the need to provide security to one of the most fundamental 
functions for maintaining a WSN while adhering to the operating constraints of IEEE 
802.15.4 enabled devices. 
Our symmetric key management scheme for secure neighbor discovery was 
designed to address the security issues of the NDP and the efficiency issues of SEND and 
other related work in secure neighbor discovery in WSN. In this scheme, we modified the 
NDP messages and SEND protocol to use identity-based symmetric key encryption rather 
than PKE. More importantly, we implemented the DH key exchange algorithm to 
perform secret key exchange between end nodes without the use of a central BS. These 
adaptations significantly improved the energy efficiency of the neighbor discovery 
process and eliminated the need for a centralized infrastructure for neighbor discovery. 
Our scheme was simulated in MATLAB to demonstrate that it could effectively 
perform secure neighbor discovery. The simulation showed that the scheme protected 
against secret key exposure by effectively minimizing the number of keys stored in each 
node. We also showed that our scheme supported continuous operation of low-powered 
devices to meet USMC operational requirements for a sensor system. Finally, our 
simulation indicated that the scheme was tolerant to transmission and processing errors. 
B. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS 
Our objective was to develop a key management protocol for secure neighbor 
discovery in WSN that could function on resource-constrained IEEE 802.15.4 enabled 
devices. In this thesis research, we have contributed the following to the study of key 
management in WSN: 
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 Development of a symmetric link key management scheme for WSN that 
generates and maintains link keys without a centralized node. 
 Simulation of the key management scheme to validate its effectiveness in 
finding one-hop neighbors and generating and maintaining link keys while 
staying within the operating constraints. 
 Measurement of the performance of the key management scheme for 
message efficiency, key distribution, power consumption, and error 
resistance. 
C.  FUTURE WORK 
We demonstrated that symmetric keys can be generated and managed solely by 
end node devices in a static network; however, there are potential areas for further 
research that can extend the utility of the scheme to mobile networks and validate it 
against common forms of attack. 
1. Mobile Sensor Networks 
The simulations showed that our key management scheme was effective in static 
WSN environments; however, the USMC will likely leverage WSN applications with 
mobile devices that require the same level of security for neighbor discovery. As a result, 
our scheme should be refined and optimized for mobile WSN. Considerations include 
improving the efficiency of the messaging scheme for mobile nodes and ensuring the 
prompt generation and expiration of keys as nodes move in and out of range of each 
other. 
2. Validation against Common Forms of Attack 
Our research served as a proof-of-concept for our key management scheme as 
applied to neighbor discovery; however, the scheme has not been subjected to various 
forms of attack such as man-in-the-middle, identity spoofing, or compromised-key attack. 
Simulations should be designed and implemented to validate the security of the scheme 
against these attacks and assess its ability to provide higher levels of confidentiality and 
integrity to the neighbor discovery process. 
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APPENDIX.  MATLAB SIMULATION CODE 
%%  SIMULATION.M 
  
%   Symmetric key generation for secure mutual authentication of 
%   decentralized nodes in a 802.15.4 wireless sensor network. 
  
%   Captain Kelvin T. Chew 
%   Student, M.S. Electrical Engineering 
%   Naval Postgraduate School 
  
%   STAGE 1: Network Initialization and Node Deployment 
%   STAGE 2: Main Program in Time Domain 
%   STAGE 3: Computation of Performance Metrics 
  





%  Declare global variables 
  
global TransRange           % maximum transmission range 
global N                    % node structure 

























%  Set global network parameters 
  
n = 100;%input('Network Size (nodes)?  ');  % number of start 
active nodes 
totalNodes = 100;    % maximum active nodes 
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runTime = 12*60;%input('Run Time?  ');  % Simulation Run Time 
(seconds) 
  
field = 100;%input('Field Size (n x n)?  ');  % size of the 
sensor field 
  
TransRange = 30;%input('Max Transmission Range?  ');  % max 
transmission range 
  
DataRate = 250000;  % max 250 kbps data rate for 805.15.4 
  
error = 0.05;      % determines overall model error rate (0-1) 
errorCount = 0; 
  
keyCount = 0;       % tracks active symmetric keys 
  
GroupKey = DataHash(rand()); % shared pre-loaded group key, 
generated from  
                             % MD5 hash of randomly generated 
number 
                             
adMessage = sprintf('%02x','advertise');        % HEX string of 
ad text 
ackMessage = sprintf('%02x','acknowleg');       % HEX string of 
ack text 
  
adCount = 0;        % tracks number of multicast advertisements 
sent 
ackCount = 0;       % tracks number of acknowledgements sent 
discardCount = 0;   % tracks number of packets discarded 
multicastCount = 0;   % tracks number of unicast advertisements 
sent 
broadcastCount = 0; 
messageCount = cell(4,runTime/60); 
errorCounter = cell(1,runTime/60); 
nodeCount = zeros(1,runTime+1);      % tracks active nodes at 
given time 
totalKeys = zeros(1,runTime+1);      % tracks total keys in 
network 
avgNodeKeys = zeros(1,runTime+1);    % tracks avg keys per node 
totalEnergy = zeros(1,runTime+1);    % tracks total energy in 
network 
avgNodeEnergy = zeros(1,runTime+1);  % tracks avg energy consumed 
per node 
  
energy.transmit = 8*10^-7;              % all values in mWh 
energy.receive = 5.867 * 10^-7; 
energy.process = 9.33*10^-6; 
energy.aes_key = 2.18*10^-6;            % 8 128-bit blocks per 
packet for 
energy.aes_encrypt = 1.09 * 10^-5;      % AES functions: key 
scheduling, 
energy.aes_decrypt = 2.47 * 10^-5;      % encryption, and 
decryption 
energy.MD5 = 1.64 * 10^-9 * 8; 
energy.DH_key_generation = .249 / 2;    %  DH for 1024-bit key 
energy.DH_key_exchange = .291 / 2;      %  Value halved per node 
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energy.node_energy = 4500;                    % capacity of 9V 
battery 
  
%  Create data structure N for all nodes that contains their 
parameters 
  
for index = 1:totalNodes 
    N(index).power = 0;                 % initialize all nodes 
powered off 
    for count = 1:n                     % initialize powered on 
nodes 
        N(count).power = 1; 
    end 
    N(index).x = round(rand(1)*field);  % x-coordinate of node in 
field 
    N(index).y = round(rand(1)*field);  % y-coordinate of node in 
field 
    N(index).nodeID = createNodeID(index);   % preloaded Node ID 
    N(index).idStorage = cell(1,totalNodes);     % stores all 
neighbor IDs 
    for count = 1:totalNodes                % initialize ID 
storage to '0' 
        N(index).idStorage{count} = 0; 
    end 
    N(index).keyStorage = cell(1,totalNodes);    % stores 
symmetric keys 
    N(index).checkFlag = cell(1,totalNodes);  % check flag for 
node timeout 
    for count = 1:totalNodes              % initialize check 
flags to '0' 
        N(index).checkFlag{count} = 0; 
    end 
    N(index).energy = 0;                % node energy consumed 
end 
  
%%  STAGE 2: MAIN PROGRAM IN TIME DOMAIN 
  
broadCount = 0; 
multiCount = 1; 
decrementCount = 1; 
expireCount = 1; 
addNodeCount = 1; 
removeNodeCount = 1; 
plotCount = 0; 
messageCounter = 0; 
addNodes = 15; 
removeNodes = 10; 
   
for time = 0:runTime         % time measured in minutes 
  
    % Neighbor discovery phase: broadcast every 5 seconds 
starting at t=0 
  
    while time == 60 * broadCount 
        multicast 
        broadCount = broadCount + 1; 
    end 
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    % Neighbor advertisement phase: multicast every 1 second 
starting t=2 
  
    while time == 20 * multiCount 
        unicast 
        multiCount = multiCount + 1; 
    end 
  
    % Periodic decrement of all node check flags (every 2 
seconds) 
  
    while time == 20 * decrementCount 
        decrementCheck 
        decrementCount = decrementCount + 1; 
    end 
     
    % Deletion of expired nodes with 6 second timeout (every 2 
seconds) 
     
    while time == 20 * expireCount 
        expireNode 
        expireCount = expireCount + 1; 
    end 
     
    % Turn on 15 new nodes (at 10 and 20 seconds) 
   
    while time == 5 * 60 * addNodeCount - 1 
        %if time > 20 
        %    break 
        %end 
        for index = (n + 1):(n + addNodes) 
            N(index).power = 1;                 % power on node 
            N(index).x = round(rand(1)*field);  % x-coordinate of 
node in field 
            N(index).y = round(rand(1)*field);  % y-coordinate of 
node in field 
            N(index).nodeID = createNodeID(index);   % preloaded 
Node ID 
            N(index).idStorage = cell(1,totalNodes);  % stores 
neighbor ID 
            for count = 1:totalNodes         % initialize ID 
storage to '0' 
                N(index).idStorage{count} = 0; 
            end 
            N(index).keyStorage = cell(1,totalNodes);    % stores 
symmetric neighbor keys 
            N(index).checkFlag = cell(1,totalNodes);     % check 
flag for ID time out 
            for count = 1:totalNodes        % initialize ID 
storage to '0' 
                N(index).checkFlag{count} = 0; 
            end 
            N(index).energy = 0;                % node energy 
remaining 
        end 
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        n = n + addNodes; 
        addNodeCount = addNodeCount + 1; 
        addNodes = 25; 
    end 
     
    % Plot network after adding nodes to include all active nodes 
and 1-hop 
    % neighbor associations.  Neighbor associations are based on 
the 
    % existence of a shared key between nodes. 
  
    while time == 6 * 60 * plotCount        % new plot every 6 
hours 
        figure(plotCount+1) 
        hold on 
  
        axis([0 field 0 field]) 
        xlabel('x (meters)') 
        ylabel('y (meters)') 
        title(['Wireless Sensor Network at time = ' 
num2str(time/60) ' Hours']) 
  
        for i = 1:totalNodes 
            if N(i).power == 1 
                plot(N(i).x,N(i).y,'bo'); 
            end 
        end 
  
        for node = 1:totalNodes 
            for i = 1:totalNodes 
                if N(node).checkFlag{i} > 0 
                    line([N(node).x,N(i).x],[N(node).y,N(i).y],'c
olor','r','LineWidth',1); 
                end 
            end 
        end 
  
        hold off 
        plotCount = plotCount + 1; 
    end 
   
    % Calculate total and average shared keys per node and the 
total and 
    % average energy consumption per node 
         
    for node = 1:totalNodes 
         
        totalEnergy(time+1) = totalEnergy(time+1) + 
N(node).energy; 
         
        for i = 1:totalNodes 
            if isempty(N(node).idStorage{i}) 
            else 
                if N(node).idStorage{i} == 0 
                else 
                    keyCount = keyCount + 1; 
                end 
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            end 
        end 
    end 
     
    %  Tabulate total messages sent everyone hour 
     
    while time == 60 * messageCounter 
        messageCount{1,messageCounter+1} = messageCounter + 1; 
        messageCount{2,messageCounter+1} = broadcastCount; 
        messageCount{3,messageCounter+1} = multicastCount; 
        messageCount{4,messageCounter+1} = ackCount; 
        errorCounter{messageCounter+1} = errorCount; 
        messageCounter = messageCounter + 1; 
    end 
         
     
    avgNodeEnergy(time+1) = energy.node_energy - 
(totalEnergy(time+1) / n); 
     
    totalKeys(time+1) = keyCount; 
    nodeCount(time+1) = n; 
    avgNodeKeys(time+1) = keyCount / nodeCount(time+1); 
    keyCount = 0; 
  
end 
     
%%  STAGE 3: PLOT AND PRINT RESULTS OF PERFORMANCE METRICS 
  
    %  Plot the average keys stored per node over the entire run 
time 
     
    t = 0:runTime; 
    figure(plotCount + 1) 
    hold on 
     
    axis([0 runTime 0 100]) 
    xlabel('time (min)') 
    ylabel('Number of Keys Per Node') 
    title('Average Keys Stored Per Node Over 12 Hours') 
     
    plot(t,avgNodeKeys,'LineWidth',3) 
    plot(t,nodeCount,'LineStyle',':','LineWidth',3) 
     
    legend('Avg Keys Per Node','Total Active Nodes') 
     
    hold off 















for TX = 1:n                        % outer for loop for 
transmitting nodes 
    for RX = 1:n                    % inner for loop for 
receiving nodes 
         
        if (inRange(N(TX).x,N(TX).y,N(RX).x,N(RX).y)) && (TX ~= 
RX) 
             
            % transmitted encrypted packet with 72-byte payload 
            TX_packet = neighborAd(N(TX).nodeID,GroupKey); 
  
            N(TX).energy = N(TX).energy + energy.transmit + 
energy.MD5 + energy.aes_encrypt + energy.aes_key; 
             
            % RX node will read the Node ID from packet and use 
the 
            % appropriate key.  If the TX Node ID is found in 
memory, then 
            % it will use the key associated with that 
ID.  Otherwise, it 
            % will use the group key to decrypt. 
  
            RX_key = findKey(RX,TX_packet); 
            broadcastCount = broadcastCount + 1; 
            N(RX).energy = N(RX).energy + energy.receive + 
energy.process; 
                                                      
            % RX node decrypts transmitted packet and 
authenticates 
            % payload.  If the payload is authentic, then RX will 
read the 
            % message type. 
             
            N(RX).energy = N(RX).energy + energy.MD5 + 
energy.aes_key + energy.aes_decrypt; 
             
            if packetAuthenticate(TX_packet,RX_key) == 1 
                
                % RX reads advertisement.  If TX node ID is not 
in RX 
                % memory, then RX will send key request to 
initiate 
                % DH key exchange.  Once the shared secret key 
between RX 
                % and TX has been generated, the node IDs and key 
are 
                % written into each node's memory. 
                 
                if checkNodeID(RX,TX,TX_packet,1) ~= 0 
                    disp('RX Key already exists') 
                end 
                 
                if checkNodeID(RX,TX,TX_packet,2) ~= 0 
                    disp('TX Key already exists') 
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                end 
                 
                if checkNodeID(RX,TX,TX_packet,1) == 0   % no key 
in RX 
                     
                    keyExchange = DHKey(randi(15),randi(15)); 
                    N(RX).energy = N(RX).energy + 
energy.DH_key_generation + energy.DH_key_exchange; 
                    N(RX).energy = N(RX).energy + 2 * 
energy.aes_encrypt + 2 * energy.aes_decrypt + 4 * energy.aes_key; 
                    N(RX).energy = N(RX).energy + 2 * 
energy.transmit + 2 * energy.receive + 2 * energy.process; 
                    N(TX).energy = N(TX).energy + 
energy.DH_key_generation + energy.DH_key_exchange; 
                    N(TX).energy = N(TX).energy + 2 * 
energy.aes_encrypt + 2 * energy.aes_decrypt + 4 * energy.aes_key; 
                    N(TX).energy = N(TX).energy + 2 * 
energy.transmit + 2 * energy.receive + 2 * energy.process; 
                     
                    N(RX).idStorage{TX} = N(TX).nodeID; 
                    N(RX).keyStorage{TX} = keyExchange; 
                     
                end 
                     
                if checkNodeID(RX,TX,TX_packet,2) == 0 % no key 
in TX 
                     
                    N(TX).idStorage{RX} = N(RX).nodeID; 
                    N(TX).keyStorage{RX} = keyExchange; 
                     
                end 
                 
                %  RX sends acknowledgement back to TX 
                 
                RX_packet = neighborAck(RX,TX); 
                N(RX).energy = N(RX).energy + energy.transmit + 
energy.MD5 + energy.aes_key + energy.aes_encrypt; 
                 
                %  TX reads acknowledgement 
                 
                N(TX).energy = N(TX).energy + energy.receive + 
energy.process + energy.MD5 + energy.aes_key + 
energy.aes_decrypt; 
                 
                if 
packetAuthenticate(RX_packet,findKey(TX,RX_packet)) == 1 
                    N(TX).checkFlag{RX} = 3; 
                    N(RX).checkFlag{TX} = 3; 
                    ackCount = ackCount + 1; 
                end 
                 
            else 
                discardCount = discardCount + 1;  % RX discards 
packet 
            end 
        end 


















for TX = 1:totalNodes    %  The outer loop will cycle through 
each node's multicast 
     
    for RX = 1:totalNodes       % Inner loop simulates single 
multicast 
  
        if (isempty(N(TX).keyStorage{RX})) == 0  % ad sent for 
every key 
             
            TX_packet = 
neighborAd(N(TX).nodeID,N(TX).keyStorage{RX}); 
             
            multicastCount = multicastCount + 1; 
             
            N(TX).energy = N(TX).energy + energy.transmit + 
energy.MD5 + energy.aes_encrypt + energy.aes_key; 
             
            RX_key = findKey(RX,TX_packet); % RX finds shared key 
in mem 
             
            N(RX).energy = N(RX).energy + energy.receive + 
energy.process; 
             
            N(RX).energy = N(RX).energy + energy.MD5 + 
energy.aes_key + energy.aes_decrypt; 
             
            if packetAuthenticate(TX_packet,RX_key) == 1 
                 
                RX_packet = neighborAck(RX,TX); 
                N(RX).energy = N(RX).energy + energy.transmit + 
energy.MD5 + energy.aes_key + energy.aes_encrypt; 
                 
                N(TX).energy = N(TX).energy + energy.receive + 
energy.process + energy.MD5 + energy.aes_key + 
energy.aes_decrypt; 
                if 
packetAuthenticate(RX_packet,findKey(TX,RX_packet)) == 1 
                    N(TX).checkFlag{RX} = 3; 
                    ackCount = ackCount + 1; 
                end 
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            else 
                disp('Error') 
            end 
        end 
    end 







function [authentic] = packetAuthenticate(packet_data,key) 
  
%%  PACKET AUTHENTICATION FUNCTION 
  
%   This function receives as input a packet of data and a 
key.  It then 
%   separates the packet into the unencrypted nonce and the 
encrypted 
%   payload.  The payload is then decrypted with AES-128 using 
the key. 
%   The unencrypted nonce is compared with the decrypted nonce to 
%   authenticate the message.  Error from all sources is 
incorporated into 





nonce = packet_data(33:40);     % separate nonce from packet data 
payload = packet_data(41:72);    % separate payload from packet 
data 
  
plain_text = aes_decrypt(payload,key);     % decrypt payload 
  
if plain_text(19:26) == lower(nonce)   % check to see that nonce 
sent in  
    if rand < (1 - error) 
        authentic = 1;              % the clear matches nonce in 
encrypted 
    else authentic = 0; 
        errorCount = errorCount + 1; 
    end 
else 







function [key] = DHKey(a_secret,b_secret) 
%% Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
%  This function will compute the shared secret key between two 
nodes A and 
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%  B using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm.  Due to the 
%  the limitations of MATLAB's modulus function, the secret 
number of each 
%  node is limited to a value from 0 to 15.  The input of the 
function 
%  will be in HEX as "0_".  The resulting shared secret will 
range from 0  
%  to 15, and a MD5 hash value is then computed to output a 
shared 128-bit 
%  key for AES encryption between neighbors. 
  
%% Main Function 
  
p = 13;     % These values for p & g are chosen based on the 
MATLAB limits. 
g = 2; 
  
a = a_secret; 
b = b_secret; 
  
A = mod(g^a,p); 
B = mod(g^b,p); 
  
A_Key = mod(B^a,p); 
B_Key = mod(A^b,p); 
  
if A_Key == B_Key 
    shared_key = DataHash(A_Key); 
else 
    disp('Error') 
end 
%% MD5 Hash of Shared Secret to Produce 128-bit AES Key 
  




function [key] = findKey(RX_Number,packet_data) 
  
%%  FIND KEY FUNCTION 
  
%   This function enables a RX node to read the node ID from a 
packet and 
%   parse its memory for a shared symmetric key.  If a shared key 
exists in 
%   memory, then the node will use that key for encryption and 
decryption. 
%   Otherwise, it will use the group key.  The function returns 







nodeID = packet_data(1:32); 
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key_found = 0; 
key = GroupKey; 
  
for i = 1:totalNodes 
    if key_found == 0 
        if nodeID == N(RX_Number).idStorage{i} 
            key = N(RX_Number).keyStorage{i}; 
            key_found = 1; 
        end 
         





function [packet] = neighborAck(RX,TX) 
  
%%  NEIGHBOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FUNCTION 
  
%   This function encrypts a 127-octet packet using AES-128 with 
the paired 
%   128-bit key and transmits the packet to the paired neighbor 
within 
%   range.  The receiver (RX) of an authentic advertisement will 
respond  
%   with an acknowledgement to the sender (TX) using the 
established  
%   symmetric key to ensure the key works.  The packet's payload 
includes  
%   the sending node's NodeID, the neighbor acknowledgement 
message, and a  






nonce = dec2hex(randi(2^32,1));  % generate 32-bit nonce in HEX 
while length(nonce) < 8         % if nonce is less than 8 digits, 
pad zeros 
    nonce = cat(2,nonce,'0'); 
end 
  
pad = '000000';                       % pad with zeros for AES 
function 
  
plain_text = cat(2,ackMessage,nonce,pad); 
  
key = GroupKey; 
  
for i = 1:length(N(RX).idStorage) 
    if N(TX).nodeID == N(RX).idStorage{i} 
        key = N(RX).keyStorage{i}; 
    end 
end 
  
%  Encrypt packet for transmission 
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function [packet] = neighborAd(nodeID,key) 
  
%%  NEIGHBOR ADVERTISEMENT FUNCTION 
  
%   This function encrypts a 127-octet packet using AES-128 with 
the group 
%   128-bit key and transmits the packet to a neighbor within 
transmission 
%   range.  The packet's payload includes the sending node's 
NodeID, the  





nonce = dec2hex(randi(2^32,1));  % generate 32-bit nonce in HEX 
while length(nonce) < 8         % if nonce is less than 8 digits, 
pad zeros 
    nonce = cat(2,nonce,'0'); 
end 
  
pad = '000000';                       % pad with zeros for AES 
function 
  
plain_text = cat(2,adMessage,nonce,pad); 
  
%  Encrypt packet for transmission 
packet = cat(2,nodeID,nonce,aes_encrypt(plain_text,key)); 
  
%  Increment global advertisement counter 




function [NodeID] = createNodeID(nodeNumber) 
  





function [ID_match] = checkNodeID(RX,TX,packet_data,option) 
  
%%  CHECK NODE ID FUNCTION 
  
%   This function will enable a node to read the node ID from a 
packet and 
%   parse its memory for a shared symmetric key.  Option 1 will 
check the 







    case 1 
        nodeID = packet_data(1:32); 
        ID_match = 0; 
  
        for i = 1:length(N(RX).idStorage) 
            if nodeID == N(RX).idStorage{i} 
                ID_match = 1; 
            end 
        end 
     
    case 2 
        nodeID = N(RX).nodeID; 
        ID_match = 0; 
         
        for i = 1:length(N(TX).idStorage) 
            if nodeID == N(TX).idStorage{i} 
                ID_match = 1; 
            end 





function [cipher_text] = aes_encrypt(pt,key_string) 
%% AES Encryption Function 
%  This function will encrypt a plain text message using AES-128 
using  
%  a 128-bit key.  The inputs are the plain text string and the 
key as a 
%  string of hex numbers.  The function will output the cipher 
text as a  
%  character string. 
%   
%% AES Key Initialization 
%  This segment receives a key as a character string and 
translates it into 
%  an array of 16 hex numbers, displayed in decimal. 
  
for i=1:length(key_string)/2 
    key(i) = hex2dec(key_string(i*2-1:i*2)); 
end 
  
%% AES Initialization Sub-Function 
%  This segment uses the AES initialization function to produce 
the AES  
%  structure, to include the AES parameters and tables. 
  
s = aesinit(key); 
  
%% AES Encryption Sub-Function 
  
for i=1:length(pt)/2 




cipher_dec = aes(s,'enc','ecb',plain_text); 




function [plain_text] = aes_decrypt(ct,key_string) 
%% AES Decryption Function 
%  This function will decrypt a cipher text message with AES-128 
using  
%  a 128-bit key.  The inputs are the cipher text string and the 
key as a 
%  string of hex numbers.  The function will output the plain 
text as a  
%  character string. 
%   
%% AES Key Initialization 
%  This segment receives a key as a character string and 
translates it into 
%  an array of 16 hex numbers, displayed in decimal. 
  
for i=1:length(key_string)/2 
    key(i) = hex2dec(key_string(i*2-1:i*2)); 
end 
  
%% AES Initialization Sub-Function 
%  This segment uses the AES initialization function to produce 
the AES  
%  structure, to include the AES parameters and tables. 
  
s = aesinit(key); 
  
%% AES Encryption Sub-Function 
  
for i=1:length(ct)/2 
    cipher_text(i) = hex2dec(ct(i*2-1:i*2)); 
end 
  
plain_dec = aes(s,'dec','ecb',cipher_text); 





function Hash = DataHash(Data, Opt) 
% DATAHASH - Checksum for Matlab array of any type 
% This function creates a hash value for an input of any type. 
The type and 
% dimensions of the input are considered as default, such that 
UINT8([0,0]) and 




% Hash = DataHash(Data, Opt) 
% 
% Michael Kleder, "Compute Hash", no structs and cells: 
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%   http://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/8944 
% Tim, "Serialize/Deserialize", converts structs and cells to a 
byte stream: 
%   http://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/29457 
  
% $JRev: R-H V:033 Sum:R+m7rAPNLvlw Date:18-Jun-2016 14:33:17 $ 
% $License: BSD (use/copy/change/redistribute on own risk, 
mention the author) $ 
% $File: Tools\GLFile\DataHash.m $ 
  
% Main function: 
=============================================================== 
% Default options: ----------------------------------------------
--------------- 
Method    = 'MD5'; 
OutFormat = 'hex'; 
isFile    = false; 
isBin     = false; 
  
% Check number and type of inputs: ------------------------------
--------------- 
nArg = nargin; 
if nArg == 2 
   if isa(Opt, 'struct') == 0   % Bad type of 2nd input: 
      Error_L('BadInput2', '2nd input [Opt] must be a struct.'); 
   end 
    
   % Specify hash algorithm: 
   if isfield(Opt, 'Method')  && ~isempty(Opt.Method)   % Short-
circuiting 
      Method = upper(Opt.Method); 
   end 
    
   % Specify output format: 
   if isfield(Opt, 'Format') && ~isempty(Opt.Format)    % Short-
circuiting 
      OutFormat = Opt.Format; 
   end 
    
   % Check if the Input type is specified - default: 'array': 
   if isfield(Opt, 'Input') && ~isempty(Opt.Input)      % Short-
circuiting 
      if strcmpi(Opt.Input, 'File') 
         if ischar(Data) == 0 
            Error_L('CannotOpen', '1st input FileName must be a 
string'); 
         end 
         isFile = true; 
          
      elseif strncmpi(Opt.Input, 'bin', 3)  % Accept 'binary' 
also 
         if (isnumeric(Data) || ischar(Data) || islogical(Data)) 
== 0 || ... 
               issparse(Data) 
            Error_L('BadDataType', ... 
               '1st input must be numeric, CHAR or LOGICAL for 
binary input.'); 
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         end 
         isBin = true; 
          
      elseif strncmpi(Opt.Input, 'asc', 3)  % 8-bit ASCII 
characters 
         if ~ischar(Data) 
            Error_L('BadDataType', ... 
               '1st input must be a CHAR for the input type 
ASCII.'); 
         end 
         isBin = true; 
         Data  = uint8(Data); 
      end 
   end 
    
elseif nArg == 0  % Reply version of this function: 
   R = Version_L; 
    
   if nargout == 0 
      disp(R); 
   else 
      Hash = R; 
   end 
    
   return; 
    
elseif nArg ~= 1  % Bad number of arguments: 
   Error_L('BadNInput', '1 or 2 inputs required.'); 
end 
  
% Create the engine: --------------------------------------------
--------------- 
try 
   Engine = java.security.MessageDigest.getInstance(Method); 
catch 
   Error_L('BadInput2', 'Invalid algorithm: [%s].', Method); 
end 
  
% Create the hash value: ----------------------------------------
--------------- 
if isFile 
   % Open the file: 
   FID = fopen(Data, 'r'); 
   if FID < 0 
      % Check existence of file: 
      Found = FileExist_L(Data); 
      if Found 
         Error_L('CantOpenFile', 'Cannot open file: %s.', Data); 
      else 
         Error_L('FileNotFound', 'File not found: %s.', Data); 
      end 
   end 
    
   % Read file in chunks to save memory and Java heap space: 
   Chunk = 1e6;      % Fastest for 1e6 on Win7/64, HDD 
   Count = Chunk;    % Dummy value to satisfy WHILE condition 
   while Count == Chunk 
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      [Data, Count] = fread(FID, Chunk, '*uint8'); 
      if Count ~= 0  % Avoid error for empty file 
         Engine.update(Data); 
      end 
   end 
   fclose(FID); 
    
   % Calculate the hash: 
   Hash = typecast(Engine.digest, 'uint8'); 
    
elseif isBin             % Contents of an elementary array, type 
tested already: 
   if isempty(Data)      % Nothing to do, Engine.update fails for 
empty input! 
      Hash = typecast(Engine.digest, 'uint8'); 
   else                  % Matlab's TYPECAST is less elegant: 
      if isnumeric(Data) 
         if isreal(Data) 
            Engine.update(typecast(Data(:), 'uint8')); 
         else 
            Engine.update(typecast(real(Data(:)), 'uint8')); 
            Engine.update(typecast(imag(Data(:)), 'uint8')); 
         end 
      elseif islogical(Data)               % TYPECAST cannot 
handle LOGICAL 
         Engine.update(typecast(uint8(Data(:)), 'uint8')); 
      elseif ischar(Data)                  % TYPECAST cannot 
handle CHAR 
         Engine.update(typecast(uint16(Data(:)), 'uint8')); 
         % Bugfix: Line removed 
      end 
      Hash = typecast(Engine.digest, 'uint8'); 
   end 
else                 % Array with type: 
   Engine = CoreHash(Data, Engine); 
   Hash   = typecast(Engine.digest, 'uint8'); 
end 
  
% Convert hash specific output format: --------------------------
--------------- 
switch OutFormat 
   case 'hex' 
      Hash = sprintf('%.2x', double(Hash)); 
   case 'HEX' 
      Hash = sprintf('%.2X', double(Hash)); 
   case 'double' 
      Hash = double(reshape(Hash, 1, [])); 
   case 'uint8' 
      Hash = reshape(Hash, 1, []); 
   case 'base64' 
      Hash = fBase64_enc(double(Hash)); 
   otherwise 
      Error_L('BadOutFormat', ... 










function Engine = CoreHash(Data, Engine) 
% This methods uses the slower TYPECAST of Matlab 
  
% Consider the type and dimensions of the array to distinguish 
arrays with the 
% same data, but different shape: [0 x 0] and [0 x 1], [1,2] and 
[1;2], 
% DOUBLE(0) and SINGLE([0,0]): 
% <  v016: [class, size, data]. BUG! 0 and zeros(1,1,0) had the 
same hash! 
% >= v016: [class, ndims, size, data] 
Engine.update([uint8(class(Data)), ... 
              typecast(uint64([ndims(Data), size(Data)]), 
'uint8')]); 
            
if issparse(Data)                    % Sparse arrays to struct: 
   [S.Index1, S.Index2, S.Value] = find(Data); 
   Engine                        = CoreHash(S, Engine); 
elseif isstruct(Data)                % Hash for all array 
elements and fields: 
   F = sort(fieldnames(Data));       % Ignore order of fields 
   for iField = 1:length(F)          % Loop over fields 
      aField = F{iField}; 
      Engine.update(uint8(aField)); 
      for iS = 1:numel(Data)         % Loop over elements of 
struct array 
         Engine = CoreHash(Data(iS).(aField), Engine); 
      end 
   end 
elseif iscell(Data)                  % Get hash for all cell 
elements: 
   for iS = 1:numel(Data) 
      Engine = CoreHash(Data{iS}, Engine); 
   end 
elseif isempty(Data)                 % Nothing to do 
elseif isnumeric(Data) 
   if isreal(Data) 
      Engine.update(typecast(Data(:), 'uint8')); 
   else 
      Engine.update(typecast(real(Data(:)), 'uint8')); 
      Engine.update(typecast(imag(Data(:)), 'uint8')); 
   end 
elseif islogical(Data)               % TYPECAST cannot handle 
LOGICAL 
   Engine.update(typecast(uint8(Data(:)), 'uint8')); 
elseif ischar(Data)                  % TYPECAST cannot handle 
CHAR 
   Engine.update(typecast(uint16(Data(:)), 'uint8')); 
elseif isa(Data, 'function_handle') 
   Engine = CoreHash(ConvertFuncHandle(Data), Engine); 
elseif (isobject(Data) || isjava(Data)) && ismethod(Data, 
'hashCode') 
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   Engine = CoreHash(char(Data.hashCode), Engine); 
else  % Most likely a user-defined object: 
   try 
      BasicData = ConvertObject(Data); 
   catch ME 
      error(['JSimon:', mfilename, ':BadDataType'], ... 
         '%s: Cannot create elementary array for type: %s\n  %s', 
... 
         mfilename, class(Data), ME.message); 
   end 
    
   try 
      Engine = CoreHash(BasicData, Engine); 
   catch ME 
      if strcmpi(ME.identifier, 'MATLAB:recursionLimit') 
         ME = MException(['JSimon:', mfilename, 
':RecursiveType'], ... 
            '%s: Cannot create hash for recursive data type: %s', 
... 
            mfilename, class(Data)); 
      end 
      throw(ME); 








function FuncKey = ConvertFuncHandle(FuncH) 
%   The subfunction ConvertFuncHandle converts function_handles 
to a struct 
%   using the Matlab function FUNCTIONS. The output of this 
function changes 
%   with the Matlab version, such that DataHash(@sin) replies 
different hashes 
%   under Matlab 6.5 and 2009a. 
%   An alternative is using the function name and name of the 
file for 
%   function_handles, but this is not unique for nested or 
anonymous functions. 
%   If the MATLABROOT is removed from the file's path, at least 
the hash of 
%   Matlab's toolbox functions is (usually!) not influenced by 
the version. 
%   Finally I'm in doubt if there is a unique method to hash 
function handles. 
%   Please adjust the subfunction ConvertFuncHandles to your 
needs. 
  
% The Matlab version influences the conversion by FUNCTIONS: 
% 1. The format of the struct replied FUNCTIONS is not fixed, 
% 2. The full paths of toolbox function e.g. for @mean differ. 
FuncKey = functions(FuncH); 
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% Include modification file time and file size. Suggested by 
Aslak Grinsted: 
if ~isempty(FuncKey.file) 
    d = dir(FuncKey.file); 
    if ~isempty(d) 
        FuncKey.filebytes = d.bytes; 
        FuncKey.filedate  = d.datenum; 
    end 
end 
  
% ALTERNATIVE: Use name and path. The <matlabroot> part of the 
toolbox functions 
% is replaced such that the hash for @mean does not depend on the 
Matlab 
% version. 
% Drawbacks: Anonymous functions, nested functions... 
% funcStruct = functions(FuncH); 
% funcfile   = strrep(funcStruct.file, matlabroot, '<MATLAB>'); 
% FuncKey    = uint8([funcStruct.function, ' ', funcfile]); 
  
% Finally I'm afraid there is no unique method to get a hash for 
a function 







function DataBin = ConvertObject(DataObj) 
% Convert a user-defined object to a binary stream. There cannot 
be a unique 
% solution, so this part is left for the user... 
  
try    % Perhaps a direct conversion is implemented: 
   DataBin = uint8(DataObj); 
    
   % Matt Raum had this excellent idea - unfortunately this 
function is 
   % undocumented and might not be supported in te future: 
   % DataBin = getByteStreamFromArray(DataObj); 
    
catch  % Or perhaps this is better: 
   WarnS   = warning('off', 'MATLAB:structOnObject'); 
   DataBin = struct(DataObj); 








function Out = fBase64_enc(In) 
% Encode numeric vector of UINT8 values to base64 string. 
% The intention of this is to create a shorter hash than the HEX 
format. 
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% Therefore a padding with '=' characters is omitted on purpose. 
  
Pool = [65:90, 97:122, 48:57, 43, 47];  % [0:9, a:z, A:Z, +, /] 
v8   = [128; 64; 32; 16; 8; 4; 2; 1]; 
v6   = [32, 16, 8, 4, 2, 1]; 
  
In  = reshape(In, 1, []); 
X   = rem(floor(In(ones(8, 1), :) ./ v8(:, ones(length(In), 1))), 
2); 
Y   = reshape([X(:); zeros(6 - rem(numel(X), 6), 1)], 6, []); 







function Ex = FileExist_L(FileName) 
% A more reliable version of EXIST(FileName, 'file'): 
dirFile = dir(FileName); 
if length(dirFile) == 1 
   Ex = ~(dirFile.isdir); 
else 








function R = Version_L() 
% The output differs between versions of this function. So give 
the user a 
% chance to recognize the version: 
% 1: 01-May-2011, Initial version 
% 2: 15-Feb-2015, The number of dimensions is considered in 
addition. 
%    In version 1 these variables had the same hash: 
%    zeros(1,1) and zeros(1,1,0), complex(0) and zeros(1,1,0,0) 
% 3: 29-Jun-2015, Struct arrays are processed field by field and 
not element 
%    by element, because this is much faster. In consequence the 
hash value 
%    differs, if the input contains a struct. 
% 4: 28-Feb-2016 15:20, same output as GetMD5 for MD5 sums. 
Therefore the 
%    dimensions are casted to UINT64 at first. 
R.HashVersion = 4; 
R.Date        = [2016, 2, 28]; 
  
R.HashMethod  = {}; 
try 
   Provider = java.security.Security.getProviders; 
   for iProvider = 1:numel(Provider) 
      S     = char(Provider(iProvider).getServices); 
      Index = strfind(S, 'MessageDigest.'); 
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      for iDigest = 1:length(Index) 
         Digest       = strtok(S(Index(iDigest):end)); 
         Digest       = strrep(Digest, 'MessageDigest.', ''); 
         R.HashMethod = cat(2, R.HashMethod, {Digest}); 
      end 
   end 
catch ME 
   fprintf(2, '%s\n', ME.message); 








function Error_L(ID, varargin) 
  
error(['JSimon:', mfilename, ':', ID], ['*** %s: ', varargin{1}], 
... 







function [output] = aes(s, oper, mode, input, iv, sbit) 
% AES Encrypt/decrypt array of bytes by AES. 
% output = aes(s, oper, mode, input, iv, sbit) 
% Encrypt/decrypt array of bytes by AES-128, AES-192, AES-256. 
% All NIST SP800-38A cipher modes supported (e.g. ECB, CBC, OFB, 
CFB, CTR). 
% Usage example:    out = aesdecrypt(s, 'dec', 'ecb', data) 
% s:                AES structure (generated by aesinit) 
% oper:             operation: 
%                   'e', 'enc', 'encrypt', 'E',... = encrypt 
%                   'd', 'dec', 'decrypt', 'D',... = decrypt 
% mode:             operation mode 
%                   'ecb' = Electronic Codebook Mode 
%                   'cbc' = Cipher Block Chaining Mode 
%                   'cfb' = Cipher Feedback Mode 
%                   'ofb' = Output Feedback Mode 
%                   'ctr' = Counter Mode 
%                   For counter mode you need external 
AES_GET_COUNTER() 
%                   counter function. 
% input:            plaintext/ciphertext byte-vector with length 
%                   multiple of 16 
% iv:               initialize vector - some modes need it 
%                   ending initialize vector is stored in s.iv, 
so you 
%                   can use aes() repetitively to encode/decode 
%                   large vector: 
%                   out = aes(s, 'enc', 'cbc', input1, iv); 
%                   out = [out aes(s, 'enc', 'cbc', input1, 
s.iv)]; 
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%                   ... 
% sbit:             bit-width parameter for CFB mode 
% output:           ciphertext/plaintext byte-vector 
% 
% See 
% Morris Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of 
Operation 
% Methods and Techniques 
% NIST Special Publication 800-38A, 2001 Edition 
% for details. 
  
% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz 
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/10/12 $ 
  
error(nargchk(4, 6, nargin)); 
  
validateattributes(s, {'struct'}, {}); 
validateattributes(oper, {'char'}, {}); 
validateattributes(mode, {'char'}, {}); 
validateattributes(input, {'numeric'}, {'real', 'vector', '>=', 
0, '<', 256}); 
if (nargin >= 5) 
    validateattributes(iv, {'numeric'}, {'real', 'vector', '>=', 
0, '<', 256}); 
    if (length(iv) ~= 16) 
        error('Length of ''iv'' must be 16.'); 
    end 
end 
if (nargin >= 6) 
    validateattributes(sbit, {'numeric'}, {'real', 'scalar', 
'>=', 1, '<=', 128}); 
end 
  
if (mod(length(input), 16)) 




    case {'encrypt', 'enc', 'e'} 
        oper = 0; 
    case {'decrypt', 'dec', 'd'} 
        oper = 1; 
    otherwise 
        error('Bad ''oper'' parameter.'); 
end 
  
blocks = length(input)/16; 




    case {'ecb'} 
        % Electronic Codebook Mode 
        % ------------------------ 
        output = zeros(1,length(input)); 
        idx = 1:16; 
        for i = 1:blocks 
 69
            if (oper) 
                % decrypt 
                output(idx) = aesdecrypt(s,input(idx)); 
            else 
                % encrypt 
                output(idx) = aesencrypt(s,input(idx)); 
            end 
            idx = idx + 16; 
        end 
         
    case {'cbc'} 
        % Cipher Block Chaining Mode 
        % -------------------------- 
        if (nargin < 5) 
            error('Missing initialization vector ''iv''.'); 
        end 
        output = zeros(1,length(input)); 
        ob = iv; 
        idx = 1:16; 
        for i = 1:blocks 
            if (oper) 
                % decrypt 
                in = input(idx); 
                output(idx) = bitxor(ob(:), aesdecrypt(s,in)'); 
                ob = in; 
            else 
                % encrypt 
                ob = bitxor(ob(:), input(idx)); 
                ob = aesencrypt(s, ob); 
                output(idx) = ob; 
            end 
            idx = idx + 16; 
        end 
        % store iv for block passing 
        s.iv = ob; 
         
    case {'cfb'} 
        % Cipher Feedback Mode 
        % -------------------- 
        % Special mode with bit manipulations 
        % sbit = 1..128 
        if (nargin < 6) 
            error('Missing ''sbit'' parameter.'); 
        end 
        % get number of bits 
        bitlen = 8*length(input); 
        % loop counter 
        rounds = round(bitlen/sbit); 
        % check  
        if (rem(bitlen, sbit)) 
            error('Message length in bits is not multiple of 
''sbit''.'); 
        end 
        % convert input to bitstream 
        inputb = reshape(de2bi(input,8,2,'left-msb')',1,bitlen); 
        % preset init. vector 
        ib = iv; 
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        ibb = reshape(de2bi(ib,8,2,'left-msb')',1,128); 
        % preset output binary stream 
        outputb = zeros(size(inputb)); 
        for i = 1:rounds 
            iba = aesencrypt(s, ib); 
            % convert to bit, MSB first 
            ibab = reshape(de2bi(iba,8,2,'left-msb')',1,128); 
            % strip only sbit MSB bits 
            % this goes to xor 
            ibab = ibab(1:sbit); 
            % strip bits from input 
            inpb = inputb((i - 1)*sbit + (1:sbit)); 
            % make xor 
            outb = bitxor(ibab, inpb); 
            % write to output 
            outputb((i - 1)*sbit + (1:sbit)) = outb; 
            if (oper) 
                % decrypt 
                % prepare new iv - bit shift 
                ibb = [ibb((1 + sbit):end) inpb]; 
            else 
                % encrypt 
                % prepare new iv - bit shift 
                ibb = [ibb((1 + sbit):end) outb]; 
            end 
            % back to byte ary 
            ib = bi2de(vec2mat(ibb,8),'left-msb'); 
            % loop 
        end 
        output = bi2de(vec2mat(outputb,8),'left-msb'); 
        % store iv for block passing 
        s.iv = ib; 
         
    case {'ofb'} 
        % Output Feedback Mode 
        % -------------------- 
        if (nargin < 5) 
            error('Missing initialization vector ''iv''.'); 
        end 
        output = zeros(1,length(input)); 
        ib = iv; 
        idx = 1:16; 
        for i = 1:blocks 
            % encrypt, decrypt 
            ib = aesencrypt(s, ib); 
            output(idx) = bitxor(ib(:), input(idx)); 
            idx = idx + 16; 
        end 
        % store iv for block passing 
        s.iv = ib; 
         
    case {'ctr'} 
        % Counter Mode 
        % ------------ 
        if (nargin < 5) 
            iv = 1; 
        end 
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        output = zeros(1,length(input)); 
        idx = 1:16; 
        for i = (iv):(iv + blocks - 1) 
            ib = AES_GET_COUNTER(i); 
            ib = aesencrypt(s, ib); 
            output(idx) = bitxor(ib(:), input(idx)); 
            idx = idx + 16; 
        end 
        s.iv = iv + blocks; 
         
    %otherwise 









function s = aesinit(key) 
% AESINIT Generate structure with s-boxes, expanded key, etc. 
% Usage:            s = aesinit([23 34 168 ... 39]) 
% key:              16 (AES-128), 24 (AES-192), and 32 (AES-256) 
%                   items array with bytes of key 
% s:                AES structure for AES parameters and tables 
  
% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz 
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/10/12 $ 
  
validateattributes(key,... 
    {'numeric'},... 
    {'real', 'vector', '>=', 0, '<=', 255}); 
  
key = key(:); 
lengthkey = length(key); 
  
switch (lengthkey) 
    case 16 
        rounds = 10; 
    case 24 
        rounds = 12; 
    case 32 
        rounds = 14; 
    otherwise 




% fill s structure 
s = {}; 
s.key = key; 
s.bytes = lengthkey; 
s.length = lengthkey * 8; 
s.rounds = rounds; 




s.mod_pol = 283; 
   
% s-box method 2 (faster) 
% ----------------------- 
  
% first build logarithm lookup table and it's inverse 
aes_logt = zeros(1,256); 
aes_ilogt = zeros(1,256); 
gen = 1; 
for i = 0:255 
    aes_logt(gen + 1) = i; 
    aes_ilogt(i + 1) = gen; 
    gen = poly_mult(gen, 3, s.mod_pol); 
end 
% store log tables 
s.aes_logt = aes_logt; 
s.aes_ilogt = aes_ilogt; 
% build s-box and it's inverse 
s_box = zeros(1,256); 
loctable = [1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128]; 
for i = 0:255 
    if (i == 0) 
        inv = 0; 
    else 
        inv = aes_ilogt(255 - aes_logt(i + 1) + 1); 
    end 
    temp = 0; 
    for bi = 0:7 
        temp2 = sign(bitand(inv, loctable(bi + 1))); 
        temp2 = temp2 + sign(bitand(inv, loctable(bi + 4 + 1))); 
        temp2 = temp2 + sign(bitand(inv, loctable(bi + 5 + 1))); 
        temp2 = temp2 + sign(bitand(inv, loctable(bi + 6 + 1))); 
        temp2 = temp2 + sign(bitand(inv, loctable(bi + 7 + 1))); 
        temp2 = temp2 + sign(bitand(99, loctable(bi + 1))); 
        if (rem(temp2,2)) 
            temp = bitor(temp, loctable(bi + 1)); 
        end 
    end 
    s_box(i + 1) = temp; 
end 
inv_s_box(s_box(1:256) + 1) = (0:255); 
% table correction (must be) 
s_box(1 + 1) = 124; 
inv_s_box(124 + 1) = 1; 
inv_s_box(99 + 1) = 0; 
s.s_box = s_box; 
s.inv_s_box = inv_s_box; 
  
% tables for fast MixColumns 
mix_col2 = zeros(1,256); 
mix_col3 = mix_col2; 
mix_col9 = mix_col2; 
mix_col11 = mix_col2; 
mix_col13 = mix_col2; 
mix_col14 = mix_col2; 
for i = 1:256 
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    mix_col2(i) = poly_mult(2, i - 1, s.mod_pol); 
    mix_col3(i) = poly_mult(3, i - 1, s.mod_pol); 
    mix_col9(i) = poly_mult(9, i - 1, s.mod_pol); 
    mix_col11(i) = poly_mult(11, i - 1, s.mod_pol); 
    mix_col13(i) = poly_mult(13, i - 1, s.mod_pol); 
    mix_col14(i) = poly_mult(14, i - 1, s.mod_pol); 
end 
s.mix_col2 = mix_col2; 
s.mix_col3 = mix_col3; 
s.mix_col9 = mix_col9; 
s.mix_col11 = mix_col11; 
s.mix_col13 = mix_col13; 
s.mix_col14 = mix_col14; 
  
% expanded key 
s.keyexp = key_expansion(s.key, s.s_box, s.rounds, s.mod_pol, 
s.aes_logt, s.aes_ilogt); 
  
% poly & invpoly 
s.poly_mat = [... 
    2 3 1 1;... 
    1 2 3 1;... 
    1 1 2 3;... 
    3 1 1 2]; 
  
s.inv_poly_mat =[... 
    14 11 13  9;... 
    9  14 11 13;... 
    13  9 14 11;... 
    11 13  9 14]; 
  




function p = poly_mult(a, b, mod_pol) 
% Multiplication in a finite field 
% For loop multiplication - slower than log/ilog tables 
% but must be used for log/ilog tables generation 
  
p = 0; 
for counter = 1 : 8 
    if (rem(b, 2)) 
        p = bitxor(p, a); 
        b = (b - 1)/2; 
    else 
        b = b/2; 
    end 
    a = 2*a; 
    if (a > 255) 
        a = bitxor(a, mod_pol); 





function inv = find_inverse(in, mod_pol) 
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% Multiplicative inverse for an element a of a finite field 
% very bad calculate & test method 
% Not used in faster version 
  
% loop over all possible bytes 
for inv = 1 : 255 
    % calculate polynomial multiplication and test to be 1 
    if (1 == poly_mult(in, inv, mod_pol)) 
        % we find it 
        break 
    end 
end 




function out = aff_trans(in) 
% Affine transformation over GF(2^8) 
% Not used for faster s-box generation 
  
% modulo polynomial for multiplication in a finite field 
% bin2dec('100000001'); 
mod_pol = 257; 
  
% multiplication polynomial 
% bin2dec('00011111'); 
mult_pol = 31; 
  
% addition polynomial 
% bin2dec('01100011'); 
add_pol = 99; 
  
% polynomial multiplication 
temp = poly_mult(in, mult_pol, mod_pol); 
  
% xor with addition polynomial 




function expkey = key_expansion(key, s_box, rounds, mod_pol, 
aes_logt, aes_ilogt) 
% Expansion of key 
   
% This is new faster version for all AES: 
rcon = 1; 
kcol = length(key)/4; 
expkey = (reshape(key,4,kcol))'; 
% traverse for all rounds 
for i = kcol:(4*(rounds + 1) - 1) 
    % copy the previous row of the expanded key into a buffer 
    temp = expkey(i, :); 
    % each kcol row 
    if (mod(i, kcol) == 0) 
        % rotate word 
        temp = temp([2 3 4 1]); 
        % s-box transform 
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        temp = s_box(temp + 1); 
        % xor 
        temp(1) = bitxor(temp(1), rcon); 
        % new rcon 
        % 1. classic poly_mult 
        % rcon = poly_mult(rcon, 2, mod_pol); 
        % 2. or faster version with log/ilog tables 
        % note rcon is never zero here 
        % rcon = aes_ilogt(mod((aes_logt(rcon + 1) + aes_logt(2 + 
1)), 255) + 1); 
        rcon = aes_ilogt(mod((aes_logt(rcon + 1) + 25), 255) + 
1); 
    else 
        if ((kcol > 6) && (mod(i, kcol) == 4)) 
            temp = s_box(temp + 1); 
        end 
    end 
    % generate new row of the expanded key 









function [out] = aesencrypt(s, in) 
% AESENCRYPT  Encrypt 16-bytes vector. 
% Usage:            out = aesencrypt(s, in) 
% s:                AES structure 
% in:               input 16-bytes vector (plaintext) 
% out:              output 16-bytes vector (ciphertext) 
  
% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz 
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/10/12 $ 
  
if (nargin ~= 2) 
    error('Bad number of input arguments.'); 
end 
  
validateattributes(s, {'struct'}, {}); 
validateattributes(in, {'numeric'}, {'real', 'vector', '>=', 0, 
'<', 256}); 
  
% copy input to local 
% 16 -> 4 x 4 
state = reshape(in, 4, 4); 
  
% Initial round 
% AddRoundKey keyexp(1:4) 
state = bitxor(state, (s.keyexp(1:4, :))'); 
  
% Loop over (s.rounds - 1) rounds 
for i = 1:(s.rounds - 1) 
    % SubBytes - lookup table 
    state = s.s_box(state + 1); 
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    % ShiftRows 
    state = shift_rows(state, 0); 
    % MixColumns 
    state = mix_columns(state, s); 
    % AddRoundKey keyexp(i*4 + (1:4)) 
    state = bitxor(state, (s.keyexp((1:4) + 4*i, :))'); 
end 
  
% Final round 
% SubBytes - lookup table 
state = s.s_box(state + 1); 
% ShiftRows 
state = shift_rows(state, 0); 
% AddRoundKey keyexp(4*s.rounds + (1:4)) 
state = bitxor(state, (s.keyexp(4*s.rounds + (1:4), :))'); 
  
% copy local to output 
% 4 x 4 -> 16 




function out = mix_columns(in, s) 
% Each column of the state is multiplied with a fixed polynomial 
mod_pol 
     
% Faster faster faster faster implementation 
out = bitxor(bitxor(bitxor([in(3,1:4); in(1,1:4); in(1,1:4); 
in(2,1:4)],... 
    [in(4,1:4); in(4,1:4); in(2,1:4); in(3,1:4)]),... 
    [s.mix_col2(in(1,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col2(in(2,1:4) + 1); 
s.mix_col2(in(3,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col3(in(1,1:4) + 1)]),... 
    [s.mix_col3(in(2,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col3(in(3,1:4) + 1); 




function p = poly_mult(a, b, mod_pol, aes_logt, aes_ilogt) 
% Multiplication in a finite field 
   
% Faster implementaion 
if (a && b) 
    p = aes_ilogt(mod((aes_logt(a + 1) + aes_logt(b + 1)), 255) + 
1); 
else 





function out = shift_rows(in, dir) 
% ShiftRows cyclically shift the rows of the 4 x 4 matrix. 
% 
%   dir = 0 (to left) 
%  | 1 2 3 4 | 
%  | 2 3 4 1 | 
%  | 3 4 1 2 | 
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%  | 4 1 2 3 | 
% 
%   dir ~= 0 (to right) 
%  | 1 2 3 4 | 
%  | 4 1 2 3 | 
%  | 3 4 1 2 | 
%  | 2 3 4 1 | 
% 
  
if (dir == 0) 
    % left 
    % use linear indexing in 2d array 
    out = reshape(in([1 6 11 16 5 10 15 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 
12]),4,4); 
    % old safe method 
%     temp = reshape(in,16,1); 
%     temp = temp([1 6 11 16 5 10 15 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 12]); 
%     out = reshape(temp,4,4); 
else 
    % right 
    % use linear indexing in 2d array 
    out = reshape(in([1 14 11 8 5 2 15 12 9 6 3 16 13 10 7 
4]),4,4); 
    % old safe method 
%     temp = reshape(in,16,1); 
%     temp = temp([1 14 11 8 5 2 15 12 9 6 3 16 13 10 7 4]); 









function [out] = aesdecrypt(s, in) 
% AESDECRYPT Decrypt 16-bytes vector. 
% Usage:            out = aesdecrypt(s, in) 
% s:                AES structure 
% in:               input 16-bytes vector (ciphertext) 
% out:              output 16-bytes vector (plaintext) 
  
% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz 
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/10/12 $ 
  
if (nargin ~= 2) 
    error('Bad number of input arguments.'); 
end 
  
validateattributes(s, {'struct'}, {}); 
validateattributes(in, {'numeric'}, {'real', 'vector', '>=', 0, 
'<', 256}); 
  
% copy input to local 
% 16 -> 4 x 4 
state = reshape(in, 4, 4); 
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% Initial round 
% AddRoundKey keyexp(s.rounds*4 + (1:4)) 
state = bitxor(state, (s.keyexp(s.rounds*4 + (1:4), :))'); 
  
% Loop over (s.rounds - 1) rounds 
for i = (s.rounds - 1):-1:1 
    % ShiftRows 
    state = shift_rows(state, 1); 
    % SubBytes - lookup table 
    state = s.inv_s_box(state + 1); 
    % AddRoundKey keyexp(i*4 + (1:4)) 
    state = bitxor(state, (s.keyexp((1:4) + 4*i, :))'); 
    % MixColumns 
    state = mix_columns(state, s); 
end 
  
% Final round 
% ShiftRows 
state = shift_rows(state, 1); 
% SubBytes - lookup table 
state = s.inv_s_box(state + 1); 
% AddRoundKey keyexp(1:4) 
state = bitxor(state, (s.keyexp(1:4, :))'); 
  
% copy local to output 
% 4 x 4 -> 16 




function out = mix_columns(in, s) 
% Each column of the state is multiplied with a fixed polynomial 
mod_pol 
    
% Faster faster faster faster implementation 
out = bitxor(bitxor(bitxor(... 
    [s.mix_col14(in(1,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col9(in(1,1:4) + 
1);  s.mix_col13(in(1,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col11(in(1,1:4) + 1)],... 
    [s.mix_col11(in(2,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col14(in(2,1:4) + 1); 
s.mix_col9(in(2,1:4) + 1);  s.mix_col13(in(2,1:4) + 1)]),... 
    [s.mix_col13(in(3,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col11(in(3,1:4) + 1); 
s.mix_col14(in(3,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col9(in(3,1:4) + 1)]),... 
    [s.mix_col9(in(4,1:4) + 1);  s.mix_col13(in(4,1:4) + 1); 




function p = poly_mult(a, b, mod_pol, aes_logt, aes_ilogt) 
% Multiplication in a finite field 
  
% Old slow implementation 
% p = 0; 
% for counter = 1:8 
%     if (rem(b,2)) 
%         p = bitxor(p,a); 
%         b = (b - 1)/2; 
%     else 
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%         b = b/2; 
%     end 
%     a = 2*a; 
%     if (a>255) 
%         a = bitxor(a,mod_pol); 
%     end 
% end 
  
% Faster implementaion 
if (a && b) 
    p = aes_ilogt(mod((aes_logt(a + 1) + aes_logt(b + 1)), 255) + 
1); 
else 





function out = shift_rows(in, dir) 
% ShiftRows cyclically shift the rows of the 4 x 4 matrix. 
% 
%   dir = 0 (to left) 
%  | 1 2 3 4 | 
%  | 2 3 4 1 | 
%  | 3 4 1 2 | 
%  | 4 1 2 3 | 
% 
%   dir ~= 0 (to right) 
%  | 1 2 3 4 | 
%  | 4 1 2 3 | 
%  | 3 4 1 2 | 
%  | 2 3 4 1 | 
% 
  
if (dir == 0) 
    % left 
    % use linear indexing in 2d array 
    out = reshape(in([1 6 11 16 5 10 15 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 
12]),4,4); 
    % old safe method 
%     temp = reshape(in,16,1); 
%     temp = temp([1 6 11 16 5 10 15 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 12]); 
%     out = reshape(temp,4,4); 
else 
    % right 
    % use linear indexing in 2d array 
    out = reshape(in([1 14 11 8 5 2 15 12 9 6 3 16 13 10 7 
4]),4,4); 
    % old safe method 
%     temp = reshape(in,16,1); 
%     temp = temp([1 14 11 8 5 2 15 12 9 6 3 16 13 10 7 4]); 





% end of file  
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